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: A Shield Becomes a Sword



A Shield Becomes a Sword: Defining and Deploying a Constitutional Theory for Communities of
Interest in Political Redistricting
Glenn D. Magpantay∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Every ten years following the census, the boundaries of every congressional, state legislative, and
city councilmanic districts are redrawn to make them equal in population, pursuant to Article I and
Amendment XIV of the U.S. Constitution.1
The Supreme Court of the United States requires that districts be redrawn to encompass
communities of common interest.2 About twenty states and several municipalities also require that
congressional, state legislative, and city councilmanic districts are drawn to preserve communities of
interest.3 Communities of common interest was originally deployed as a defense to preserve minorityopportunity districts drawn in accordance with the Voting Rights Act.4 Today, it has shifted to an
affirmative redistricting criterion. It was a shield that has become a sword.
The Court has defined communities of interest as groupings of people who have similar values,
shared interests, or common characteristics.5 Yet this legal standard is still vague in application. Few
scholars have studied communities of interest.6 Some advocates have toyed with the idea of using the legal
concept of communities of interest to affirmatively draw districts that give racial and ethnic minority groups
representation.7 This article will apply a legal theory to define and deploy this concept.
This article will first give an overview of the constitutional law of redistricting.8 Second, it will
review recent malapportionment and redistricting cases. Many cases involved special masters where judges
required them to preserve communities of interest in redrawn voting districts. Third, it will survey various
efforts by political scientists to define a “community,” “neighborhood,” and a “community of common
interest.”
Fourth and most substantively, I will offer a constitutional legal standard to define a community of
interest. Then, I will offer a strategy to deploy this legal theory in redistricting, both at the outset during the
public participation phase and in litigation. Both can democratize the process. As an example, the strategy
will recount the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund’s redistricting strategy where local
residents defined their own communities of interests.9 While there are some challenges in enforcing this
standard in litigation, my theory will offer a way through the quandary that can ensure racial and ethnic
minorities enjoy meaningful representation.


∗
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School and former Democracy Program Director, Asian American Legal Defense
and Education Fund (AALDEF), New York, NY.
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
2
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995).
3
JUSTIN LEVITT, COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, 1 (updated Nov. 2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/09%20Communities%20of%20Interest.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/B6VY-VMZD.
4
See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 109 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’ d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
5
Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
6
Only a few legal scholars have studied communities of interest, the most prominent is Professor James A. Gardner, James A. Gardner,
Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 934-38
(2006). Social scientists who have studied and tried to define communities of interest include Paul Ong at UCLA; Bernard Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 87 (1985); T.M. Guterbock, Community of Interest: Its Definition, Measurement
and Assessment,” SOC. PRAC. REV. 1(2), 88-104 (1990); TARRY HUM, REDISTRICTING AND THE NEW DEMOGRAPHICS: DEFINING “COMMUNITIES
OF INTEREST” IN NEW YORK CITY (2002); Benjamin Forest, Information Sovereignty and GIS: The Evolution of "Communities of Interest" in
Political Redistricting, 23 POL. GEO. 425, 446 (2004).
7
TARRY HUM, ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, ASIAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN NEW YORK CITY: LOCATING
BOUNDARIES AND COMMON INTERESTS 25 (2002).
8
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
9
HUM, supra note 7.
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Fifth, this article will offer a conclusion to guide lawmakers, advocates, and redistricting attorneys
as they prepare for the 2021 redistricting cycle.
 

    






A. Apportionment and Redistricting


Every ten years, following the decennial census,10 the 435 congressional seats are apportioned
among the fifty states.11 Then census data12 is used to redraw the boundaries of local councilmanic, state
legislative, and congressional districts to make them equal in population.13
Redistricting is largely a political process, guided by a few legal principles. Congressional and state
legislative districts are usually redrawn by state legislatures.14 City councils redraw new city council
districts. Sometimes, redistricting is vested in an independent redistricting commission.15
This process had allowed for the redrawing of districts that were unfair “gerrymanders” which gave
minority political parties, or racial groups, unfair disadvantages in electing representatives.16 There were
many instances where districts unfairly gave the majority political party or incumbents unfair advantages,
or disadvantages, in electing a representative.17 In one example in New York in 2001, the residence of a
challenger was intentionally placed outside of an incumbent’s district boundaries so that he could not enter
the race in the future elections.18 In another example in Texas in 2002, when Republicans won control of
the state legislature,19 the lawmakers embarked on another round of redistricting to create more republicanleaning districts and dismantle districts that elected Democrats.20
Election reformers and scholars have argued that district-drawing should be taken out of the hands
of those who would run for those districts and have pressed for expanded independent redistricting
commissions.21 “Nineteen states have adopted some form of independent redistricting commissions.”22
“Despite a plethora of models for redistricting commissions, no consensus has emerged as to what
constitutes the best model.”23 Some election reformers have discovered that it is not whether redistricting


See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1994).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; 2 U.S.C. § 2(a), (b) (1996).
12
See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994).
13
The principle of “one person, one vote” applies to congressional districts under Article I, see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1964); and for state and local legislative districts under the 14th Amendment, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
14
Peter S. Wattson, How to Draw Redistricting Plans That Will Stand Up in Court, Sept. 26, 2010,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/Watson_Redistricting_Plans.pdf (citing NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, LIMITS ON
GERRYMANDERS app. C, D (2009)), archived at https://perma.cc/DG9T-YUP9.
15
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1366, 1387-90 (2005).
16
See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995).
17
See generally Hays, 515 U.S. at 737; Miller, 515 U.S. at 900.
18
Jonathan P. Hicks, In District Lines Critics See Albany Protecting Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at B4.
19
Ralph Blumenthal, After Bitter Fight, Texas Senate Redraws Congressional Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at A1.
20
David Barboza & Carl Hulse, Texas’ Republicans Fume; Democrats Remain AWOL, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A17; Associated
Press, National Briefing Southwest: Texas: Democrats on the Run Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at A18; League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
21
A number of scholars have also written about the benefits, drawbacks, and unintended consequences of independent redistricting
commissions (IRCs). See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional
Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 212 (2003); Stevens F. Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redistricters More Accountable to the People, Make Them
The People, 5 DUKE F. CONT. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 37, 51-52 (2010); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 641-45 (2002) (arguing for insulating redistricting from politics and that redistricting by elected officials is per se unconstitutional);
Gary King & Robert X. Browning, Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1251
(1987). But see Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting
Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 667 (2002). But see David G. Oedel, Allen K. Lynch, Sean E. Mulholland & Neil T. Edwards, Does the
Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional Partisanship?, 54 VILL. L. REV. 57, 68-80 (2009) (citing David Oedel, Mercer
Study (2007) (unpublished study) (on file with Mercer University School of Law Furman Smith Law Library)).
22
David Schultz, Regulating the Political Thicket: Congress, the Courts, and State Reapportionment Commissions, 3 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 107, 137 (2008). See JUSTIN LEVITT & BETHANY FOSTER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20-22,
28-35 (2008) (reviewing commissions).
23
Schultz, supra note 22, at 138.
10
11
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is done by independent redistricting commissions, but more important is the goal, which should be to
preserve communities of interest.24 This author has argued that independent redistricting commissions are
essentially inconsequential for communities of color.25
Concurrent with partisan shenanigans, redistricting is also an opportunity to enhance the
meaningful representation of traditionally underrepresented groups.26 This could include the drawing of
more minority-opportunity districts in which minority populations constitute majorities of the districts’
overall populations,27 or where the minority populations are less than a majority but large enough to
influence the outcome of an election.28
There are only a few restrictions in the redrawing of districts. Foremost, districts must be equal in
population29 and they cannot intentionally discriminate against minority voters, pursuant to the Constitution
and the Voting Rights Act.30 After these obligatory federal requirements, most states31 and localities also
require that districts be reasonably compact32 and “contiguous.”33 The borders should follow natural
geographical and political boundaries, such that they do not cross bodies of water, or divide cities and
counties.34 They should not displace incumbents.35 Finally, they should encompass “communities of
common interest,”36 groupings of people who have similar values, shared interests, or common
characteristics.37 The Supreme Court of the United States has held these as “traditional redistricting criteria”
to which all districts must encompass.38
Some states also require that new districts preserve the core of prior districts39 or that districts for
the lower house of the state legislature nest within larger districts for the upper house, called “nesting.”40
B. Voting Rights Act – Minority Vote Dilution


The Voting Rights Act guards against the dilution of minority voting strength in redistricting, either
intentionally or in effect.41 The most well-known has been the fragmenting, or cracking,42 of a large minority
population enclave so that they their aggregated votes were divided between two or more districts and they


24
Susan Lerner & Sean Coffey, How to Salvage N.Y. Redistricting Reform, TIMESUNION (Sept. 21, 2011, 12:20 AM),
https://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/How-to-salvage-N-Y-redistricting-reform-2180826.php, archived at https://perma.cc/WY97-QS64;
Schultz, supra note 22, at 137-138.
25
Glenn D. Magpantay, So Much Huff and Puff: Whether Independent Redistricting Commissions Are Inconsequential for Communities
of Color, 16 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AMER. L.J. 4, 6 (2011).
26
Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Voting Rights and Representation: A Perspective from the Northeast, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.
REV. 739, 758 (2001).
27
For a fuller discussion of the need for majority-minority districts to promote minority representation see Janai S. Nelson, White
Challengers, Black Majorities: Reconciling Competition in Majority-Minority Districts with the Promise of the Voting Rights Act, 95 GEO. L.J.
1287 (2007).
28
See also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
29
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727-28, 732, 741 (1983); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-208 (1962).
30
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996).
31
See NAT. CONF. OF STAT. LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, 75-76 tbl.5 (1999) (reviewing states which also mandate
constitutionally or statutorily compactness, contiguity, preservation of political subdivisions, preservation of communities of interest, incumbency
protection, and preserving the core of prior districts).
32
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959-60 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1414
(E.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
33
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 906 (1995).
34
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647; Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
35
See Abrams, 521 U.S. at 98.
36
Miller, 515 U.S. at 919-20; Abrams, 521 U.S. at 74.
37
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 435 (2006); Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16.
38
Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16.
39
See Abrams, 521 U.S. at 98.
40
Levitt, supra note 22, at 64.
41
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), (b) (1994).
42
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986).
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could never elect a candidate of their choice.43 Had the geographic area been kept whole the minority
population would have been able to elect a minority candidate to represent them.
The federal Voting Rights Act prohibits this intentional form of minority vote dilution, as well as
other redistricting schemes that may, in effect, deny racial and ethnic minority political representation.44
The Act compels the drawing of majority–minority districts when certain “preconditions” exist, as
illustrated in Thornburg v. Gingles.45 The minority community has to: (1) be sufficiently numerous and
compact to form a majority in a single district; (2) be politically cohesive, in that members of the minority
group tend to vote alike; and (3) suffer from racially polarized voting in which the white majority votes as
a bloc so as to routinely defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate.46
In Bartlett v. Strickland, the Court clarified that under the first Gingles prong, if the minority group
does not comprise at least a 51% majority district population, then there is no Voting Rights Act infraction,
and thereby no obligation to keep racial minorities together.47 In effect, Bartlett held that there is no
obligation to draw minority-influenced districts.
Adhering to these principles, a watershed of new majority-minority voting districts across the
Nation were drawn at the local, state, and federal levels after the 1991 redistricting.48 The effort was highly
successful, especially for African-Americans and Latinos.49 Fourteen states adopted congressional
redistricting plans that doubled the number of congressional majority-minority districts from twenty-six to
fifty-two.50 Eleven states created sixteen new majority-Black districts, and six states added eleven new
majority-Latino districts.51
However, these redistricting criteria set a threshold that denied some racial and ethnic groups—
largely due to insufficient size or geographic dispersion—the ability of gaining representation through
majority–minority districts.52 Nevertheless, with aggressive enforcement of the Voting Rights Act,
communities of color made significant gains before 2000.53


Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153-54, (1993) (prohibiting “packing” where the minority group is over-concentrated
into one district where they be fairly drawn into two).
45
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-52. The landmark Gingles case defined how the Voting Rights Act would remedy minority vote dilution by
compelling the drawing of majority-minority districts that gave racial and ethnic minorities opportunities to elect candidates of their choice.
46
See id. at 50-52, 55. The minority community also had to suffer from racial discrimination under the totality of the circumstances.
Justice Stevens held that this analysis is conducted by a review of “objective factors” codified in the Senate Report accompanying the Voting
Rights Act. See id. at 36-37, 44 (quoting S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28).
47
Id. at 50-52, 55; Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
48
Fourteen states adopted congressional redistricting plans that doubled the number of congressional majority-minority districts from
twenty-six to fifty-two. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1041 n.37 & 38 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49
See Frank Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (citing Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce News, U.S. Bureau of the Census, No. of Cong. Districts with Black or Hispanic Majorities Doubles, Census
Bureau Says, Revised, (Mar. 24, 1993); Black-and-Hispanic-Majority Districts, CQ WKLY. REP., July 10, 1993). Some conservative
commentators argue that majority-minority districts are not needed to achieve minority representation. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Voting
Rights: Another Affirmative Action Mess, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2031 (1996). They point out that people of color are elected from both majoritywhite and majority-minority districts. See id. However, supporters of majority-minority districts counter that nearly every African American
member of the U.S. House of Representatives is elected from a district with a majority-black population. See Brenda Wright, Voting Rights: Yes:
Toward a Politics of Inclusion, 79 A.B.A. J. 44 (1993).
50
See Bush, 517 U.S. at 1041 nn.37 & 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51
Parker, supra note 49, at 2-3 n.5.
52
See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 129 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997) (citing Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) (holding that Asians were not large enough and too geographically dispersed to meet the Gingles preconditions, at least
insofar as to draw a majority-Asian district, using 1990 census data)); U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN
AMERICANS IN THE 1990S 159 (1992). See also, Magpantay, supra note 25, at 739, for a discussion of Asian opportunity districts and the Gingles
limitations.
53
William D. Hicks, Carl E. Klarner, Seth C. McKee & Daniel A. Smith, Revisiting Majority-Minority Districts and Black
Representation, 71 POL. RES. Q. 408, 408-23 (2017). Admittedly, the Voting Rights Act is under Constitutional attack from the Supreme Court of
the United States. The gains compelled by the Act in the 1990s were questions by the Court and a new line of cases emerged that curtailed the
redrawing of majority-minority districts under Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) and Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). More recently,
although the Court upheld the enforcement provisions of the Act, the Justices questioning signals the Court’s unease with provisions of the Act.
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). However, advocates are resigned to still fully deploy the Act to
preserve minority representation and the U.S Department of Justice has said that they can “‘chew gum and walk at the same time,’ that they can
enforce the Voting Rights Act and defend its constitutionality as well.” Julie Fernandes, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, U.S Department of Justice, remarks at NAACP LDF Redistricting Seminar, Arlie House, Warrenton, VA, Oct. 8, 2010.
43
44
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C. Fourteenth Amendment – Shaw Claim


Throughout the 1990s, the Court further cut back on redistricting that enfranchised communities of
color.54 Beginning with the 1992 landmark decision in Shaw v. Reno,55 the Court announced for the first
time that white voters could assert a claim of voter discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause when
drawn into a majority–minority voting district.56
In Shaw v. Reno,57 white plaintiffs challenged North Carolina’s majority–minority congressional
district. The Court found that the redistricting plan “concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single
district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions.”58 In justifying its opinion, the majority held that a majority–minority district,
[b]ears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception
that members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status,
or the community in which they live—think alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere
as impermissible racial stereotypes.59
The Court held that the district at issue was so “bizarre” and “irregular in shape” that its shape could not be
rationally understood as anything other than racial gerrymandering, which was impermissible under the
Constitution.60
In Miller v. Johnson,61 the Court followed and elaborated on Shaw.62 The Court held that shape was
an important consideration in redistricting because it could demonstrate that “race for its own sake, and not
other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district
lines.”63 The majority commented that when a state redistricts, it may be aware of race, but its consideration
of race cannot predominate the process.64 To successfully challenge the district, “a plaintiff must prove that


The modern voting rights cases should not be surprising in light of the Court’s conservative colorblind jurisprudence, most notably
revealed in its anti-affirmative action cases, such as Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). See Linda Greenhouse, In Step on
Racial Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at A1. For a fuller discussion of the Court’s colorblindness jurisprudence via education, business and
redistricting, see Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the Rehnquist Court’s Commitment to Color-Blindness Versus Racial Justice,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 763 (1996).
55
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630.
56
Id. at 649-50. Contra United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 150-66 (1977) (holding that white voters may not challenge a
districting plan that includes majority-minority districts to promote minority representation). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s reasoning in Shaw
was quite remarkable. First, she likened districts that gave racial and ethnic minorities representation to “political apartheid.” Shaw, 509 U.S. at
647-49. Second, she intimated that minority representatives were somehow ineffective in representing white voters. See id. at 647-49, 656-58.
Third, she placed higher standards and strict scrutiny on districts giving minorities increased representation, but such standards are seldom
applied to majority-white districts. See id. at 653-56; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1035 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Fourth, the when a person of
color is elected from an ugly shaped district, that districts shape is now a matter of constitutional inquiry. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649-50; see also
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993). In Shaw, O’Connor described the district as “bizarre” in its shape. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649-50.
But in drawing districts, a multitude of factors and considerations come into play. Non-square and non-cyclical shapes are destined. See Pildes &
Niemi, supra, at 483; Daniel D. Polsby, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problems of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 652 (1993). For a Court whose jurisprudence is supposedly “colorblind,” its decisions render an exacerbation of color differentials and the
insurgence of racial disenfranchisement under the law.
57
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630.
58
Id. at 647-49.
59
Id. Justice David Souter criticized the O’Connor for likening the district to political apartheid much later in Bush v. Vera. See Bush,
516 U.S. at 1035 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). He stated that in segregation, as in apartheid, there was the subjugation of a class of people based
on race, a badge of inferiority is placed upon them. See id. at 1053-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). In the challenged districts, none of these intentions
were present. See id. There was only an intention to give racial minorities representation. See id. Further, no inferiority message was conveyed to
the white communities outside of the district. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
60
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649-50. Racial gerrymandering occurs during the process of redistricting. See id. It is when the state intentionally
separates voters into difference districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. See id.
61
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995).
62
Id. at 911-12.
63
Id. (emphasis added).
64
Id. at 915-16.
54
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the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to
compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations.”65
In Miller, the Court noted the shape of the district in question was not completely bizarre.66 The
Court held, however, that while “compactness and contiguity” were maintained in the districting process,
they were subordinated to racial objectives.67 The Court also stated that there was not even any community
interest represented by the district’s makeup outside of race.68 The true inquiry was whether the
consideration of race was predominant in the districting process.69 Shape only served an evidentiary
function in this inquiry.70
The Court concluded that race could not be the predominant criterion in redrawing voting districts.71
The Court clarified that in this analysis, the consideration of race is allowed, but could not subordinate
“traditional districting criteria” such as compactness, contiguity, respect for geographic and political
boundaries, and preservation of communities of interest.72
Thus, without more, the intentional drawing of majority–minority districts, even with the
benevolent intention of enfranchising minority voters, and even when they met the Gingles preconditions,
was deemed unconstitutional.73 Majority–minority voting districts in North Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana,
Texas, Florida, New York, and Virginia were struck down under Shaw and Miller.74
One way out of this quandary of taking race into account, but not by too much, is that challenged
minority-opportunity districts could be upheld if they were shown to encompass communities of common
interest.75 This became a new strategy in redistricting.76 Asian-Americans in New York have successfully
used the community of interest strategy to defend a majority–minority voting district in Diaz v. Silver.77
Moreover, as redistricting has moved more into litigation, communities of interest have become an
affirmative way to give meaningful representation to underrepresented groups. The challenge here, which
this article aims to illuminate, is how to define a community of interest, in terms of its interests and spatial
boundaries. American democracy is based on a premise that territory or geography is a proxy for group
interest.78 But modern communication systems, transportation, and heightened mobility have disrupted the
truth of this premise. Political interests are often shared by a community, not necessarily a specific territory.
This article will explore these concepts.


Id.
Id. at 917-18.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 919-20.
69
Id. at 915-16.
70
See id.
71
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16.
72
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16.
73
Id. at 927.
74
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630 (North Carolina.); Miller, 515 U.S. at 900 (Georgia); Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360, 371-72 (W.D.
La.) (per curiam), appeals dismissed as moot, 116 S. Ct. 2542 (1996) (Louisiana); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (Texas); Johnson v.
Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (Florida); Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36, (1997) (New
York); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, mem., 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997) (Virginia). In Illinois, a majority-minority voting
district was challenged, however it survived the Court’s scrutiny. See King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill.), vacated mem.,
117 S. Ct. 429 (1996), remanded to, 979 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff’d, 118 S. Ct. 877 (1998).
75
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648.
76
Id.
77
See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
78
Gardner, supra note 6, 934-38 (2006) (discussing “Territorial Representation as Interest Representation”).
65
66
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III. COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST: THEORY


A. The Legal Requirement


Over twenty states and countless municipalities require that new districts preserve communities of
common interest in redistricting.79 The state constitutions of Alabama,80 Alaska,81 Arizona,82 Colorado,83
Hawaii,84 New York,85 and Oklahoma86 require the preservation of communities of interest in redistricting.
State statutes in California,87 Hawaii,88 Idaho,89 Maine,90 Massachusetts,91 Michigan,92 Oregon,93 South
Dakota,94 Utah,95 Vermont,96 Washington,97 West Virginia,98 and Wisconsin99 require the same. State
redistricting guidelines in Arkansas,100 Georgia,101 Kansas,102 Kentucky,103 Minnesota,104 Mississippi,105


79
JUSTIN LEVITT & BETHANY FOSTER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20-22, 28-35 (2008). For
a comprehensive summary of the redistricting requirements for each state, see Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science
Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 87 (1985).
80
ALASKA CONST. art. IX, §§ 198-200.
81
ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6 (new districts shall contain “as nearly as practicable a relatively integrated socio-economic area”).
82
ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1.
83
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47 (requiring that “communities of interest, including ethnic, cultural, economic, trade area, geographic, and
demo-graphic factors, shall be preserved within a single [state legislative] district wherever possible”).
84
HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (consideration of socio-economic interests).
85
N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 4-5.
86
OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 9A (in drawing districts for state senate, economic and political interests shall be considered).
87
CAROL OJEDA-KIMBROUGH, EUGENE LEE & YEN LING SHEK, UCLA ASIAN AM. STUDIES CTR., THE ASIAN AMERICANS
REDISTRICTING PROJECT: LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE “COMMUNITY OF COMMON INTEREST” REQUIREMENT, 8 (2009),
https://www.academia.edu/2381684/The_Asian_Americans_Redistricting_Project, archived at https://perma.cc/B69Q-VUR3.
88
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2(b)(6) (LexisNexis 2019) (directing apportionment commission to avoid “submergence of an area in a
larger [congressional] district wherein substantially different socio-economic interests pre-dominate”).
89
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 5; IDAHO CODE § 72-1506 (2019).
90
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206-A (1995) (apportionment commission shall “give weight to the interests of local communities
when making district boundary decisions”).
91
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 43, § 131 (2019) (city council districts “shall be drawn with a view toward preserving the integrity of
existing neighborhoods”). See Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 609 F. Supp. 739 (D. Mass. 1985) (upholding Boston's
council district plan), aff'd, 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1986).
92
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6, as amended Nov. 6, 2018; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 3.63 (2000), 4.261 (1997), 4.261a (1997).
93
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 188.010(1)(d) (2017) (district lines should be drawn so that they do not “divide communities of common
interest”).
94
S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-2-41 (2012).
95
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-19-201 (LexisNexis 2018).
96
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1903(b)(2) (1992) (districts for state legislature shall recognize and maintain “patterns of geography, social
interaction, trade, political ties and common interests” insofar as possible).
97
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2019) (district lines should coincide with areas recognized as communities of
interest).
98
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-2-1(c)(5) (2011) (in crossing county lines, the legislature should take into account the “community of interests
of the people involved”).
99
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 4.001(3) (2003) (“to the very limited extent that precise population equality is unattainable,” statutes reflect “good
faith effort to apportion the legislature giving due consideration to... communities of interest”).
100
Redistricting Criteria Approved by the Courts, ARK. BD. OF APPORTIONMENT, http://www.arkansasredistricting.org/redistrictingcriteria (last visited Mar. 19, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/K2TB-WDFG.
101
GA. CONST. art. III, § 2, ¶ II; GA. H. LEGIS. & CONG. REAPPORTIONMENT COMM., 2011-2012 GUIDELINES H. LEGIS. & CONG.
REAPPORTIONMENT COMM.
102
KAN. CONST. art. 10, § 1; KAN. LEGIS. RESEARCH DEPT., GUIDELINES & CRITERIA 2012 KAN. CONG. & LEGIS. REDISTRICTING, Jan. 9,
2012.
103
KY. CONST. § 33; KY. INTERIM J. COMM. STATE GOV’T, SUBCOMM. REDISTRICTING, CRITERIA & STANDARDS CONG. REDISTRICTING,
July 11, 1991.
104
MINN. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2-3; MINN. STAT. § 2.91; Hippert v. Ritchie, No. A11-152 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Nov. 4, 2011)
(Order Stating Redistricting Principles & Requirements for Plan Submissions).
105
MISS. CODE ANN. § 5-3-101 (1981); STANDING J. LEGIS. COMM. REAPPORTIONMENT & STANDING J. CONG. REDISTRICTING COMM.,
CRITERIA LEGIS. & CONG. REDISTRICTING, Apr. 5, 2012; Analysis of Factors Considered, Smith v. Hosemann, No. 3:01-cv-855 (S.D. Miss., Dec.
19, 2011).
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Nevada,106 New Mexico,107 North Carolina,108 Oklahoma,109 South Carolina,110 Virginia,111 and Wyoming112
also require the preservation of communities of interest in redistricting, be it state legislative or
congressional redistricting. Despite the widespread adoption of this requirement, most states fail to define
communities of interest thoroughly.113
B. A Theory of a Community of Interest


The Supreme Court of the United States defined “communities of interest”114 as groupings of people
with “actual shared interests”115 and/or common socio-economic characteristics.116 Yet this concept can still
be vague and therefore difficult to apply. While there may be easier ways to identify socio-economic
characteristics, identifying similar values and shared interests with spatial boundaries can be more difficult.
Advocates and voting rights attorneys have employed novel techniques in working with community groups
to explore this idea in redistricting.
1. “Neighborhoods” + “Communities” = “Communities of Common Interest”


The concepts of neighborhoods, communities, and communities of common interest are often
invoked in redistricting, and often confused. A neighborhood is typically defined externally and assigned,
whereas a community is internally defined and self-defined.117 Neighborhoods are spatially bounded while
communities may not have a common locality.118 The law then incoporates both neighborhoods and
communities into a community of common interest.
i. Neighborhood
“Defining the concept of neighborhood has [long] been the subject of interest among [political
science] scholars, urban planners, sociologists, and geographers.”119 Definitions can vary based on the types
and functions of neighborhoods.120 Municipal planning agencies often enumerate and define their city’s


106
NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 5; N.R.S. Ch. 304, App.; Order Re: Redistricting, Guy v. Miller, No. 11-OC-42-1B (1st Jud. Dist., Carson City
Sept. 21, 2011).
107
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-7C-3 (1991), 2-8D-2 (2002); LEGIS. COUNCIL, GUIDELINES DEV. STATE & CONG. REDISTRICTING PLANS, Jan.
17, 2011.
108
N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 5; S. COMM. REDISTRICTING & H. SELECT COMM. REDISTRICTING, N.C. HOUSE AND SENATE PLANS
CRITERIA, Aug. 10, 2017; J. SELECT COMM. CONG. REDISTRICTING, N.C. CONG. PLAN CRITERIA, Feb. 16, 2016.
109
OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 9A; H. REDISTRICTING COMM., 2011 REDISTRICTING COMM. GUIDELINES REDISTRICTING, Feb. 14, 2011.
110
S. JUD. COMM., 2011 REDISTRICTING GUIDELINES, Apr. 13, 2011; S.C. H.R.. JUD. COMM. ELECTION LAWS SUBCOMM.,
2011 GUIDELINES & CRITERIA CONG. & LEGIS. REDISTRICTING, Apr. 28, 2011.
111
VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-305 (2001); H. Res. 1, Leg. Sess. (Va. 2011); S. Res. 1, Leg. Sess. (Va. 2011); Cong.
Res. 1, Leg. Sess. (Va. 2015).
112
WYO. CONST. art. 3, §§ 3, 49; Memorandum from State of Wyo. Leg. to Joint Corps., Elections & Political Subdivisions Interim
Comm. (Apr. 13, 2011).
113
Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 87 (1985) (providing a comprehensive
summary of the apportionment factors considered by each state).
114
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995).
115
Id.
116
See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997) (No. 95-CV-2591).
117
See generally Deborah G. Martin, Enacting Neighborhood, URBAN GEOGRAPHY, 361 (2003).
118
Id. at 367.
119
OJEDA-KIMBROUGH ET AL., supra note 87, at 8.
120
Martin, supra note 117, at 363.
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neighborhoods.121 In general, neighborhoods are “sites of daily life and social interaction.”122
"In defining a neighborhood, clearly stated geographic units such as census tracts, zip codes,
political districts, school districts, service areas, or municipalities are used to denote boundaries."123 “These
boundaries [can] expand [(more Chinese people moving into a Chinatown)] or contract [(such as through
gentrification)] over time, as drawn by municipalities.”124 “Administrative agencies can set fixed
boundaries.”125 Yet, "individual perception of where their neighborhood begins and ends may likewise
shrink or expand depending on context, personal experience, and other factors including their socioeconomic status, educational attainment, and whether they are recent immigrants or not."126 One set of
scholar activists concluded that, “in general, residents who are more educated, higher income, not recent
immigrants, and with more social ties in their neighborhood are more likely to say that their neighborhood
is a larger area than other respondents.”127 Residents may also “unofficially” designate an identity or
character with their perceived neighborhood, with or without city action, based on what residents perceive
their neighborhood to be.128
ii. Community
Not all neighborhoods are communities. Examples can be "suburban areas where residents do not
know their neighbors and share little if any social interaction with other residents."129
"While neighborhoods are the physical areas where social interaction can take place, a community
is made up of people organized around common values and social cohesion, sometimes within a shared
geographical location; for example, a local neighborhood, suburb, village, town, city, or region."130
Sometimes, communities can be geographically identified where a community is synonymous with
a neighborhood.131 The most notable examples are the neighborhood-communities of Chinatowns–whether
it be in Los Angeles, New York, or San Francisco– these are areas "where new immigrants and long-time
residents share the same space along with the institutions that support the relationship of its members;
institutions such as churches, schools and civic organizations, important indicators of ‘community.’”132
A geographic community may also be racially or ethnically diverse. For example, the bulk of the
population of Koreatown in Los Angeles is made up of Latino-, South Asian-, and Korean-Americans.133
Modern transportation systems, technological advances, and globalization have encouraged the
formation of “communities that function without having to be in the same location.”134 These include


See, e.g., New York City Department of City Planning, New York: A City of Neighborhoods, DEP’T CITY PLAN.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/city-neighborhoods.page (last visited Dec. 12, 2019), archieved at https://perma.cc/VNE2-NEQ8;
San Francisco Planning Department, Elements of a Great Neighborhood, CITY & COUNCIL SAN FRANCISCO PLAN. DEP’T,
https://sfgov.org/sfplanningarchive/eight-elements-great-neighborhoodhttps://sfgov.org/sfplanningarchive/eight-elements-great-neighborhood
(last visited Dec. 12, 2019), archieved at https://perma.cc/CDH7-P5KH; LOS ANGELES, DEP’T NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT,
https://empowerla.org/department/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2019), archieved at https://perma.cc/Z4AD-CRNJ.
While these Departments sometimes do not explicitly define of the term “neighborhood,” one could infer from the context that neighborhood
refers to a place within the larger city where people reside, work, or recreate. OJEDA-KIMBROUGH ET AL., supra note 87, at 8.
122
Martin, supra note 119, at 365.
123
OJEDA-KIMBROUGH ET AL., supra note 87, at 8 (citing NARAYAN SASTRY, ANNE R. PEBLEY & MICHELA ZONTA, NEIGHBORHOOD
DEFINITIONS AND THE SPATIAL DIMENSION OF DAILY LIFE IN LOS ANGELES, (Labor and Population Program Working Paper Series 03-02,
RAND Publications 2002); Guo, J. Y. & Bhat, C. R., Operationalizing the Concept of Neighborhood: Application to Residential Location Choice
Analysis, JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY, 15, 31-45 (2007)).
124
OJEDA-KIMBROUGH, supra note 87, at 8.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.at 9.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. (citing REVITALIZING URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 9 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds.,1996); see also PETER KWONG, THE NEW
CHINATOWN (rev. ed. 1996).
133
OJEDA-KIMBROUGH ET AL., supra note 87, at 9.
134
Id.
121
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communities sharing the same culture, identity, or need. For example, there is a community of FilipinoAmerican physicians in the Greater New York Area,135 or those who are hearing impaired share the same
experiences, needs, "and identity while not necessarily residing in the same neighborhood."136 The LGBT
community is oftentimes anchored at an LGBT residential or business enclave, but usually its members are
more geographically dispersed.137 Some would argue that "[a]nother example is the Asian-American
community, a community of people from different countries of origin but formed out of a shared identity
and needs shaped by external or structural conditions in American society including racism and residential
segregation.”138
iii. Community of Common Interest
In a legal context, communities that are spatially defined that also share common values or political
interests are communities of common interest.139 Some neighborhoods can be communities of common
interest, and sometimes communities of common interest transcend neighborhoods.140 "Geographically
defined communities can include neighborhoods that are historical preservation areas, ethnic and cultural
enclaves, [and] economic and business districts," for example.141
In redistricting, those who draw districts sometimes (and perhaps should always) base their
determination of which neighborhoods will be kept whole based on social science evidence.142 "When
communities of interest are divided into several different districts, the residents of the area can face
significant challenges to having their needs and interests addressed."143
"What constitutes an “interest” for the purpose of communities of common interest in redistricting
is varied."144
In defining a possible community of interest, one could refer to the census, demographic
studies, surveys, or political information to assess what social and economic characteristics
community members share, such as: income levels; educational backgrounds; housing
patterns and living conditions (urban, suburban, rural); cultural and language backgrounds;
employment and economic patterns"; how community residents are employed; the
economic base of the community; health and environmental conditions; and issues of
concern raised with their representative (concerns about crime, education, etc.).145


135

Kevin L. Nadal & the Filipino-American Nat’l Historical Soc’y Metro. N.Y. Chapter, Images of America: Filipinos in New York City

92 (2015).
OJEDA-KIMBROUGH, supra note 87 at 9.
Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay Interests Through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 125 (1996).
138
OJEDA-KIMBROUGH ET AL., supra note 87 at 9.
139
Id.
140
Id. One scholar, UCLA Urban Planning Professor Paul Ong, has "proposed four conceptual approaches to defining ‘communities of
interest’ based on a variety of social science disciplines including political science, sociology, urban planning, and economics. The concepts
below offer potential approaches and rationales, to the degree that it motivates the residents of a neighborhood to take collective action, to
defining what are ‘communities of common interest’:
•
a community of limited liability - concerns about crime and public safety, health and environmental conditions and how a community
stands to lose as a group;
•
a community of opportunities - where one immigrant community (e.g., Asian) share interests with other immigrant communities—
Latino, African American, Caribbean in an after-school program for all children of the neighborhood;
•
a community of shared institutions - community, religious & civic organizations, schools; and,
•
a community bound by common goods – where everyone can share the benefits of the neighborhood; for example, fresh air, a public
park." Id. at 10 (citing TARRY HUM, REDISTRICTING AND THE NEW DEMOGRAPHICS: DEFINING “COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST” IN NEW
YORK CITY (2002)).
141
OJEDA-KIMBROUGH ET AL, supra note 87 at 9.
142
Id. at 10.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
136
137
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"While the concept of ‘community of interest’ has legal implications in the political redistricting
process, how this concept is applied to protect minority voting rights and political representation has" been
used infrequently.146
2. Objective Data to Identify a Community of Interest


The concept of community refers to some type of connection—social connections in terms of
informal networks among friends and kin; functional connections pertaining to consumption, production,
and the exchange of goods and services; cultural connections expressed through religious practices or ethnic
identity; or circumstantial connections reflected in economic status or lifestyles.147
Communities of interest can be defined by many different criteria:
• Census data, taken through the American Community Survey,148 can be used to identify people who
share common traits or characteristics based on149: socio-economic status,150 education,151
employment and economic characteristics,152 health,153 religion,154 ethnicity,155 and housing
characteristics.156
• Geography can demonstrate riparian interests or interests because of mountainous terrain. People
living alongside a seashore or lake have different interests than those who live inland.


Id.
Id. at 9 (citing Chaskin, Robert J., Defining Neighborhood: History, Theory, and Practice. The Chapin Hall Center for Children,
University of Chicago (1995)).
148
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/guidance/subjects.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2019), archieved at https://perma.cc/Z9B3-RL3X.
149
For an excellent step-by-step guide in how to use ACS data, see Univ. of Cal., Los Angeles – Redistricting Workgroup, The Asian
Americans Redistricting Project: Accessing Secondary Data, UCLA ASIAN AMERICAN STUDIES CTR. 12-16 (2009),
https://www.academia.edu/2381684/The_Asian_Americans_Redistricting_Project, archived at https://perma.cc/4TW9-7ECL.
150
Basic demographic questions asked on the American Community Survey (ACS), are: age, sex, race/ethnicity, and family relationship
(married, roommate, partner, child, grandparent). Social characteristics asked are: ancestry, citizenship, year of entry, disability, fertility,
grandparents as caregivers, language, marital status and marital history, place of birth, residence one year ago (migration), and veteran status.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 148.
For redistricting, see, e.g., Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1997) (affirming the lower court's finding that a
“predominantly urban, low-income population” could constitute a community of interest); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995) (evidence
of “fractured ... social, and economic interests” refuted contention that district contained a community of interest); see also Chen v. City of
Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 513 (5th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that satisfactory evidence of socio-economic status could demonstrate the existence of a
community of interest, but finding that the plaintiffs did not provide it); Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 512 (E.D. Tex.) (three-judge
panel) (finding “evidence of differences in socio-economic status” was properly, though not persuasively, deployed to undermine the existence of
a community of interest), vacated and remanded sub nom. Henderson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004).
151
Other social characteristics about education asked on the ACS are: educational attainment, field of degree, and school enrollment. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 148.
For redistricting, see, e.g., Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that “less-educated” citizens
comprised a community of interest on the basis of “common social and economic needs”); Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (finding
“evidence of differences in ... education” was properly, though not persuasively, deployed to undermine the existence of a community of interest).
152
Economic characteristics asked on the ACS are: class of worker, employment status, health insurance coverage, income and earnings,
industry, commuting to work, occupation, poverty, work status, and public assistance (food stamps). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 148.
For redistricting, see, e.g., Theriot, 185 F.3d at 486 (citizens “more often unemployed” than voters in other districts comprised a
community of interest on the basis of “common social and economic needs”); Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (finding “evidence of differences in
... employment” relevant to existence of a community of interest).
153
Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (finding “evidence of differences in ... health” relevant to existence of a community of interest).
154
See, e.g., Kelley v. Bennett, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (three-judge panel) (“There are no doubt religious, class, and
social communities of interest that cross county lines and whose protection might be a legitimate consideration in districting decisions.”), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000) (per curiam).
155
See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (assuming that Latinos comprise a community of interest);
Meza v. Galvin, 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 75 (D. Mass. 2004) (three-judge panel) (“the Hispanic community” can comprise “an ethnically-based
community of interest”).
156
Housing characteristics asked on the ACS are: house-heating fuel, kitchen facilities, owner statistics, plumbing facilities, renter
statistics, rooms and bedrooms, telephone service, tenure, units in structure, value of home, vehicles available, year householder moved into unit,
year structure built. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 148.
146
147
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• City Planning data can reveal housing stock, housing character (high-rise condominium, cooperative apartments, apartment renters, single-family detached houses), water usage, traffic and
public transportation, land use and zoning, or historic.157
• Community definitions can be collected through community feedback through surveying
community residents to define their community and common interests.158
Other data sources can define a community of interest. Immigration data can demonstrate country
of birth and migration settlement patterns.159 Election return can demonstrate political behavior and if voters
vote more Republican or Democrat.160 One commentator has argued that school districts are communities
of interest.161 Another commentator has argued that media markets help define a community of interest.162
One scholar has argued that counties and political subdivisions are, in and of themselves, communities of
interest.163
Social scientists often refer to these as “secondary data”—information attained from an external
source—as opposed to primary data, which is attained through conducting surveys and interviews
directly.164
Elected officials themselves “also may be knowledgeable, albeit self-interested, sources for”
identifying communities of interest.165 Elected officials often have lived in the community for years and
have spent years campaigning for the support of various groups.166 “As a result, most representatives
recognize and understand the constituencies and interests within their districts.”167
Each one of these has a different ability to be comparative. Census data, geography, city planning
data, and school data are generally well accepted. They are politically neutral. Advocates and their
opponents can cite the same sources to make their points best in favor of their positions. Census data and
school data can show socio-economic characteristics, but geography and city planning data are proxies for
shared interests.168 Generally, people who live in rental apartments have different needs and concerns than
homeowners. The former may be more concerned with sanitation and landlord accountability, where the
latter may be more concerned with property taxes.


157
See, e.g., NYC DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, Community District Needs, Manhattan, (Nov. 9, 2019),
https://communityprofiles.planning.nyc.gov archived at https://perma.cc/7C39-82DF.
158
TARRY HUM, ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, ASIAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN NEW YORK CITY: LOCATING
BOUNDARIES AND COMMON INTERESTS 4-5 (2002); MacDonald, Karin. 1998. “Preparing for Redistricting in 2001 – Communities Define Their
Interests.” Unpublished Paper presented at 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston at 2.
159
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 148.
160
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 919-20 (1995) (evidence of “fractured political ... interests” refuted contention that district contained a
community of interest).
161
Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495 (2010).
162
See generally Jason C. Miller, Community as a Redistricting Principle: Consulting Media Markets in Drawing District Lines, 86 IND.
L.J. SUPPLEMENT 1, 3 (2010).
163
James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering,
37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 939 (2006) (“First, the inhabitants of a county or similar local government unit share a common local economy and
economic life. Second, county residents participate together in the public life of a shared unit of political and governmental administration”). But
see People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 588 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 (Ill. 1991) (“Boundary lines of villages, townships, counties and cities do not
necessarily reveal communities of interest.”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 973 (1992).
164
Univ. of Cal., Los Angeles – Redistricting Workgroup, supra note 149.
165
Stephen J. Malone, Note, Recognizing Communities of Interest in a Legislative Apportionment Plan, 83 VA. L. REV. 461, 478 (1997)
(citing Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1985-86 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
166
Id. For example, U.S. Representative Earl Hillard of Alabama explained that his irregularly-shaped district contains a community of
interest composed of bi-racial, lower-income residents:
The poor part of my cities are basically black areas, but most of the whites in Alabama who are poor live in my district also because I
represent quite a large rural area and there are quite a few rural whites who are poor. . . . I don't have to worry about race because it's
not an issue with me because if I look out for the poor, I automatically look out for the majority interest of the people in my district. A
majority of the black interest and a majority of the white interest.
Id. (citation omitted)
167
Id.
168
See LEVITT, supra note 22, at 54.
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Identifying “actual shared interests” is more challenging in that it is characteristically more
subjective. One model was developed that uses community feedback through surveying community
residents to define their community and common interests.169 These are political values.
While neighborhoods are spatial entities, their boundaries can be subjective and influenced by
various social factors including gender, race, ethnicity, economic class, and age.170 The fairly limited
research available on race and neighborhood definition has almost exclusively focused on AfricanAmericans.171
3. Communities Defining their Communities of Interest


The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (“AALDEF”) commissioned two studies,
in 2000172 and 2010,173 that had community residents define their own neighborhood boundaries and
community interests.174 The innovative study was modeled on a 1998 study of Oakland, California
conducted by Karin Mac Donald at the University of California, Berkeley and described in an unpublished
paper titled, “Preparing for Redistricting in 2001 – Communities Define Their Interests.”175
Similar to Mac Donald’s research objective, AALDEF’s study sought to determine if “distinctive
and coherent neighborhood interests and geographical boundaries” define Asian-American communities.176
With a similar goal to gather information about neighborhood definitions and issues, this study surveyed
community stakeholders providing a timely venue for local residents and grassroots institutions to articulate
and define neighborhood concerns, interests, and spatial boundaries in the context of redistricting and
political representation.177 AALDEF modified and expanded Mac Donald’s survey in several ways to make
it applicable in New York City and relevant for Asian-Americans.178
In AALDEF’s 2000 study, more than four hundred and fifty community stakeholders were
surveyed, in several Asian languages and dialects, about their neighborhoods.179 The study identified areas
in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens where Asian-Americans shared common interests.180 AALDEF
repeated a smaller and narrower version of the study for the upcoming redistricting cycle after the 2010
census.181


169
See HUM, supra note 7 (citing MacDonald, Karin. 1998. “Preparing for Redistricting in 2001 – Communities Define Their Interests.”
Unpublished Paper presented at 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston). See also Univ. of Cal., Los
Angeles – Redistricting Workgroup, supra note 149.
170
HUM, supra note 7, at 4 (citing Chaskin, Robert J., Defining Neighborhood: History, Theory, and Practice. The Chapin Hall Center for
Children, University of Chicago (1995)).
171
Id. For example, in Jonathan Winburn’s book, The Realities of Redistricting: Following the Rules and Limiting Gerrymandering in
State Legislative Redistricting, Winburn does not study communities of interest and presents no evidence of their effectiveness as antigerrymandering constraints, even though he discusses two of the five states studied. Richard L. Engstrom, Partisan Gerrymandering and State
Legislative Districts, 8 ELECTION L.J. 227 (2009).
172
HUM, supra note 7, at 25.
173
ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, Asian American Communities of Interest Survey (2012).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 3 (citing MacDonald, Karin. 1998. “Preparing for Redistricting in 2001 – Communities Define Their Interests.” Unpublished
Paper presented at 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston). For a helpful methodology of survey
development, implementation, and coding, see University of California, Los Angeles – Redistricting Workgroup, The Asian Americans
Redistricting Project: Conducting Stakeholder Surveys, UCLA Asian American Studies Center (2009), available at
http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/policy/Stakeholder_Final(2).pdf
176
ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, supra note 173, at 3 (citing MacDonald, Karin. 1998. “Preparing for
Redistricting in 2001 – Communities Define Their Interests.” Unpublished Paper presented at 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Boston at 2).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
New York State Legislative Task Force for Demographic Research and Reapportionment: Queens Public Hearing Before LATFOR,
245 (N.Y. September 7, 2011) [hereinafter N.Y. Task Force Hearings] https://latfor.state.ny.us/docs/20020313/queens.html, archived at
https://perma.cc/Y7HR-NSPH, (statement of Jerry Vattamala, Staff Attorney, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund).
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Respondents were asked about: neighborhood concerns and issues; neighborhood boundaries;
neighborhood differences; and similar neighborhoods.182
In the study, AALDEF asked respondents “about the most common concerns and issues in their
neighborhoods.”183 Respondents identified an array of issues, and several common themes emerged.184 The
study reviewed these issues and the top five neighborhood concerns reflecting the issues of greatest
consensus for each neighborhood area.185 Shared concerns about neighborhood quality, public safety,
education, and housing were common to all Asian neighborhoods.186
Because in redistricting, communities of common interests must be reflected within geographic
boundaries, surveyors asked respondents to draw the borders of their neighborhoods on a map.187 In
identifying a core neighborhood area of greatest agreement among survey respondents, the study reduced
the multiple boundaries by locating those boundaries that constituted the most significant north, south, east,
and west borders.188
Respondents were asked, “How is the area that is outside your neighborhood boundaries different
from your neighborhood?”189 The responses to this open-ended question included: race and ethnic
composition, economic differences, culture and language, neighborhood quality, housing, land use, political
differences, history and social issues, physical characteristics, and familiarity.190
In some instances, the Asian-American communities of interest may not be sufficiently large
enough to constitute an entire district, and adjacent areas may not share similar interests. Thus, the study
asked respondents to identify neighborhoods that were “similar” in terms of residential composition and/or
issues and concerns.191
In AALDEF’s 2010 study, AALDEF again met with community groups across New York City,
asking them to draw their neighborhood boundaries on a map and to identify the most common concerns
and issues in their neighborhoods.192
Many of the communities . . . had concerns regarding immigration, language-assistance,
social services, health care, and workers’ rights. . . . [T]hese shared concerns centered on
daily neighborhood quality issues as well as neighborhood institutions that provide
opportunities for education, employment, social services, immigrant rights, and economic
justice. Lastly, groups were asked to identify the surrounding neighborhoods that were
most similar and the most different to their neighborhood.193
It was an iterative process. AALDEF identified the Asian-American communities of interest that should
not be divided as new districts were to be drawn.194


ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, ASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST SURVEY IN NEW YORK
CITY, 3 (2011).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Asian American Communities of Interest Survey in New York City, supra note 182, at 3.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
N.Y. Task Force Hearings, supra note 181 (statement of Jerry Vattamala, Staff Attorney, Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund).
193
Id.
194
Id.
182
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C. A Community of Interest Theory in Redistricting


During the redistricting hearings before the New York State Legislative Task Force for
Demographic Research and Reappointment (LATFOR), the entity which redraws district boundaries for
the state legislature and Congress,195 community advocates argued that communities of common interest
needed to be maintained and kept whole. To assert this, they had to define and present them.
1. The Identified Asian-American Communities of Interest


The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) submitted their study that
identified Asian-American communities of interest to keep whole in the following four neighborhood
examples196:
i. Flushing and Bayside, Queens
"The Chinese-American population in Flushing is mostly from Taiwan."197 "Many of the immigrant
population are limited English-proficient and there is a need for language assistance."198 "The
neighborhoods of Flushing and Bayside share many common interests, such as the need for language
assistance, immigration issues, and reliance on public transportation, and they should be grouped together
into the same legislative district when possible."199 Bayside is home to a large Korean-American
community.200 Bayside is a residential neighborhood where most people own their homes.201 Bayside retains
many close cultural and economic ties to neighboring Flushing and should be grouped together into the
same legislative district whenever possible.
ii. Richmond Hill/South Ozone Park, Queens
Richmond Hill and South Ozone Park are a single neighborhood comprised of mainly
Bangladeshis, Indians, Sikhs, and Indo-Caribbeans.202 The residents are homeowners and the neighborhood
is zoned for single and multi-family homes.203 There are many extended families living together, reflective
of their communities “back home” in South Asia and the South Asian Indo-Caribbean communities.204 Most
residents are dependent upon public transportation and utilize the A train and J train subway lines for
transportation services.205 There are a high number of senior citizens that reside in Richmond Hill, but the
only senior center is in Ozone Park on Sutter Avenue.206 There is only one park in Richmond Hill, Phil
Rizutto “Scooter Park” (formerly Smokey Oval Park).207 There is no other space for recreation in Richmond
Hill.
The neighborhood of South Jamaica, east of the Van Wyck Expressway, should not be grouped
with Richmond Hill and South Ozone Park because: the home property values are significantly less; the


N.Y. CODE ANN. art 5-A, § 83-m (2010); N.Y. Task Force Hearings supra note 181 (statement of Jerry Vattamala, Staff Attorney,
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund).
196
N.Y. Task Force Hearings, supra note 181 (statement of Jerry Vattamala, Staff Attorney, Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Asian American Communities of Interest Survey in New York City, supra note 182, at 5.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 10.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, supra note 173, at 10.
206
Id.
207
Id.
195
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high school population is not comprised of students from any of Richmond Hill’s or South Ozone Park’s
middle schools; the population in South Jamaica is not comprised of many immigrants like Richmond
Hill/South Ozone Park; and the population of South Jamaica is mostly African-American who have settled
in that neighborhood for a long time and who rely on different public transportation lines, mainly the E
train subway line to Jamaica Center.208
iii. Chinatown/Lower East Side,Manhattan
Many residents in Chinatown and the Lower East Side are foreign born.209 Because many of these
recent immigrants are limited English proficient, they often encounter language barriers and have specific
language needs.210 Most of the residents in Chinatown are Chinese-Americans while residents in the Lower
East Side are Chinese-Americans and Latino.211 Residents in the neighborhood live in rented government
housing projects and small tenement buildings.212 The Latino and Chinese residents have similar lowincome levels, perform many of the same low- wage, unskilled jobs and share similar education levels (high
school level or less).213 Residents rely mainly on public transportation, including the 6, B, Q, D, N, R, and
F train subway lines, as well as the M15 and M22 buses.214
The neighborhood of the Lower East Side is most similar to Chinatown and should be grouped
together with Chinatown in the same legislative district when possible because residents share a similar
socio-economic status, housing, and have many similar common interests. The neighborhoods of Tribeca
and SoHo should not be grouped with Chinatown because those neighborhoods are of a vastly different
socio-economic status and have drastically higher income levels.
iv. Sunset Park, Brooklyn
Sunset Park is home to a largely Chinese and Latino population, as well as a South Asian
population.215 The Chinese population speaks Cantonese and is very similar to the Chinese community in
Manhattan’s Chinatown.216 Many of the residents are young, have small children, and live in subdivided
housing.217 Many of the residents are working class and not professionals.218 Many of the new Fujianese
immigrants are moving into residences along the D and N train subway lines.219
v. Survey Shortcomings
It is important to note that there were some challenges in this study. Some neighborhood boundaries
were nested.220 The concept of “nested” neighborhoods recognizes that clusters of people may share a
common identity and interests, although they may not necessarily be contiguous since “the boundaries of


208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Id. at 11.
Id. at 14.
ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, supra note 173, at 14.
Id. at 15, 16.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, supra note 173, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
HUM, supra note 7, at 5.
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nesting neighborhoods are not easily contained within one another.”221 In one example, the neighborhood
of Jackson Heights appeared wholly within a larger neighborhood referred to as Elmhurst.222
Community members sometimes had difficulty in understanding the purpose of the exercise. Some
would say that, “my community is where all the Chinese are.” Respondents would then try to identity the
demographic data and comport with that.223 Sometimes they were unable to comprehend political
redistricting, which can be a difficult concept to comprehend when one is beginning to understand
American structures of democracy and method of voting.
Others did not understand the differences between “a community,” “a community of common
interest,” and “a neighborhood.” Minority communities tend to understand “communities” as noncontiguous or linear areas based on identity. They understand “neighborhoods” as contiguous, twodimensional spatial areas that can be bounded by streets and landmarks. A community of common interest
falls somewhere between these two extremes.
Notwithstanding these few shortcomings, once defined, the application of AALDEF’s spatially
defined communities of interest was reasonably easy to apply. Granted, not all communities of interest
could be kept whole. Spatially defined communities of interest were not voting district proposals and so
they did not have equal population, the first and more pronounced redistricting criterion. Some areas were
geographically large and would encompass multiple state legislative districts. Others were smaller areas
that needed to be brought together with other neighborhoods within larger congressional districts. The
defined community of interest was used for plan analysis, where redistricting plans or specific district
proposals can be measured against the boundary lines drawn.
1. Applying the Asian-American Communities of Interest


AALDEF submitted its report and neighborhood boundaries for consideration by LATFOR224 as
well as federal court.225 These areas did not wholly correspond to race; they were communities where race
and ethnicity were one factor of commonality.226
Once these areas were drawn, there were many benefits.227 It could easily show how a current
district’s boundaries divided the community, splitting it into different districts.228 It gave guidance to
AALDEF’s and other mappers, so when they would develop a redistricting plan they had guides for areas
to keep whole.229 Moreover, it offered the organization a neutral way to conduct plan analysis.230 Once
redistricting proposals came out of the commission, or even competing plans from other organizations,
those plans could be judged based on the integrity of the Asian-American communities of interest.231


221
Id. at 5 (citing Chaskin, Robert J., Defining Neighborhood: History, Theory, and Practice. The Chapin Hall Center for Children,
University of Chicago 14 (1995)).
222
Hearing on Congressional and State Legislative Redistricting before the New York State Legislative Task Force for Demographic
Research and Reapportionment, Queens Borough Hall 24 (N.Y. March 13, 2002) (statement of Genaro Herrera, La Gran Alianza de Queens).
223
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 937-46 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“But ethnicity itself can tie people together, as volumes of
social science literature have documented--even people with divergent economic interests. For this reason, ethnicity is a significant force in
political life.”).
224
Hearing on Congressional and Legislative Redistricting before the New York State Legislative Task Force for Demographic Research
and Reapportionment, Queens Borough Hall, 47, (N.Y. March 13, 2002) (Hearing Statement of Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Legal
Defense and Education Fund Staff Attorney).
225
Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (2004), AALDEF Submiss. to the Spec. Master (May 6, 2002) as Rodriguez v. Pataki, 02
CV 0618 (RMB).
226
Asian American Communities of Interest Survey in New York City, supra note 182, at 1, 3.
227
See id.
228
Id.
229
See id.
230
Hearing on Congressional and State Legislative Redistricting before the New York State Legislative Task Force for Demographic
Research and Reapportionment, Queens Borough Hall 52 (N.Y. March 13, 2002) (statement of James Wu, Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund Representative).
231
ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, supra note 173, at 16.
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This effort has democratized the redistricting process. Moreover, the simple exercises in conducting
the survey itself necessitated the explanation of redistricting.232 More people understood the process after
the survey was conducted.233
The Court has defined communities of interest as groupings of people who have similar values,
shared interests, or common characteristics.234 There is an ancillary benefit to drawing districts based on
community of interest.235 They promote that coalition building with other traditionally disenfranchised
communities is necessary.236 Community of interest encourages Asian-Americans, African-Americans, and
Latinos to work together.237 Additionally, there may be some similar interests with multi-racial groups, such
as lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender, low-income, or working-class communities. Common interests should
be explored with the broad goal of ensuring the redistricting process is fair for all underrepresented
communities.
IV. COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST: IN PRACTICE


In redistricting, minority voting rights advocates have used the concept of communities of interest
to defend minority-opportunity districts from legal challenge.238 It has been an effective shield. But a new
strategy emerged to affirmatively wield the concept of communities of interest as a sword. Here, advocates
affirmatively draw districts that encompass coherent and spatially defined communities of interest to give
communities meaningful political representation, which also results in a possible minority-opportunity
voting district.239
A. Communities of Interest as a Shield


Drawing districts based on communities of interest has been used to overcome constitutional
challenges to minority-opportunity districts.240 Asian-Americans have successfully used the community of
interest strategy to defend minority-opportunity voting districts.241
Diaz v. Silver was a successful challenge to New York’s 12th Congressional District.242 That district
was originally drawn as a majority-Latino district, which is currently represented by the first Puerto Ricanborn member of Congress, Nydia Velásquez.243 Representative Velásquez has long championed the interest
of immigrants, the poor, and non-English speakers.244 The district was a little more than 54% percent


Id. at 1.
See id. at 3.
234
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995).
235
Id. at 933 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
236
ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, supra note 173, at 16.
237
See, e.g., Margaret Fung, A District Like a Mosaic, N.Y. Newsday, Apr. 12, 1991, at 60 (discussing common interests between
Chinese immigrants in Chinatown with Latino immigrants in the Lower East Side).
238
See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
239
Id. at 117.
240
Frank Adams, Why Legislative Findings can Pad-Lock Redistricting Plans in Racial-Gerrymandering Cases, 39 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1371, 1379 (2006) (using as an example the City of Houston's 1997 successful redistricting efforts, which were affirmed by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); Darren Rosenblum, Overcoming “Stigmas”: Lesbian and Gay Districts and Black Electoral Empowerment, 39
HOW. L.J. 149, 197 (1995).
241
See ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, supra note 173.
242
See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 98, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
243
Richard, J. Levy, Boundaries in Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 1997) (graphical chart and map display) (sourcing Congressional
Quarterly (based on 1980 and 1990 census data)) https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/27/nyregion/court-outlaws-new-york-district-drawn-up-toaid-hispanic-voters.html, archived at https://perma.cc/XX3A-5S4Y; Nydia Velazquez, Biography, VELAZQUEZ.HOUSE.GOV (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://velazquez.house.gov/about/full-biography, archived at https://perma.cc/57N4-XBBW.
244
Velazquez, supra note 243.
232
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Latino,245 but 21% percent of the population was Asian.246 So when the district was challenged under
Shaw,247 Asian-Americans intervened as parties in the suit to protect the district.248
The Asian intervenors argued that the Asian-American community in the district, which lived in
Manhattan’s Chinatown and Brooklyn’s Sunset Park, constituted a single “community of interest” because
they shared common socio-economic characteristics.249 They were not only Asian-Americans, but they were
specifically Chinese.250 They spoke a common Chinese dialect (Cantonese), read Chinese-language
newspapers, were employed in low-wage industries, had low levels of formal U.S. education, rented their
homes, rode the same subway lines, and were immigrants and naturalized citizens.251 This was true of the
Asian-Americans in Manhattan’s Chinatown, but also of Asian-Americans in Brooklyn’s Sunset Park.252
The two neighborhoods were not contiguous.253
But they were a single community of interest.254 They were connected by the N/R subway lines, as
well as provided van lines.255 Residents in Sunset Park worked in Chinatown.256 There were also many
private and municipal health and social service agencies serving both neighborhoods.257
Race was simply one of many factors considered in drawing the district lines.258 The court accepted
this argument, holding that Asian-Americans in the 12th Congressional District were a single community
of interest, and should be kept together within the district.259 In so holding, the court allowed the district to
be a constitutionally permissible Asian-influence district.260
However, the court did not accept the main arguments by the State or Latino parties, which also
tried to defend the district.261 The court held that the consideration of race, at least for the Latino community,
predominated in the original drawing of the district pursuant to Shaw and Miller.262 Thus, the court
compelled the state to redraw the district’s boundaries.263 When the legislature redrew the district, it reduced
the Latino population, but kept the Asian-American communities together.264 Accordingly, the district
became a multi-racial, minority-opportunity district, where 40% of the residents are Latino and 20% are
Asian-American.265 The court accepted the new plan and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the new
district lines.266 Congressmember Velásquez still represents the district, and she still champions the interest
of immigrants, the poor, and non-English speakers.267 Through the district, Asian-Americans have enjoyed
the meaningful representation of their interests.268


See Levy, supra note 243.
See id.
247
Id.
248
See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 98, 101-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing AALDEF Mem. Support Intervention, at 1).
249
See Affidavit of Defendant-Intervenor Peter Lau at ¶¶ 46-55; Affidavit of Defendant-Intervenor John Kuo Wei Tchen ¶¶ 9-38, Diaz v.
Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997) (No. 95-CV-2591).
250
Id. at 102.
251
See id.
252
Id. at 102.
253
Id. at 118.
254
Id. at 102.
255
See Asian American Communities of Interest Survey in New York City, supra note 182, at 12, 15.
256
Lau Aff. at ¶¶ 46-55; Wei Tchen Aff. ¶¶ 9-38; See Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96.
257
See id.
258
See Mem. in Opp. to Pl. Mot. for Summ. Judgment, of Defendant-Intervenor Peter Lau, John Kuo Wei Tchen, Michael Shin, Diaz v.
Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997) (No. 95-CV-2591).
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See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 123-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
260
Id.
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The State and Latino parties argued that Shaw and Miller did not apply; that if they did apply, race was not a predominant criterion in
redrawing the district; and that even if race was a significant criterion in drawing the district, the district still survived strict scrutiny. See Diaz v.
Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 117-24, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
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Id. at 121-22.
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Id. at 131.
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This successful defensive strategy can inform affirmative redistricting.269 The court rulings and
litigation strategy have been hailed as a way to reconcile the Shaw decisions with the goal of safeguarding
and increasing the meaningful political representation of Asian-Americans and other racial and ethnic
minorities.270
Drawing districts on the basis of Asian-American communities of interest is not simply a legal
fiction nor a proxy for race.271 Asian-American communities of interest can be viewed as smaller subsets
of the Asian-American community. Race and ethnicity, along with income level, educational level, English
ability, and other socio-economic characteristics, in addition to external factors, must be used to prove that
specific Asian-American communities are communities of interest.272
Moreover, a state must actually consider communities of interest at the time districts are drawn
rather than simply reciting them later as pretext.273 Courts will search the record to ensure that the legislature
actually had data or other evidence of communities of interest ex ante.274 The objective is to ensure that
evidence of communities of interest, rather than race, genuinely must motivate the placement of district
lines.275 States cannot simply claim that communities of interest determine the district shapes when, in fact,
the district lines are really drawn to group voters by race.276 Communities of interest cannot be recited ex
post to save an apportionment plan if they are merely pretext.277
Drawing new districts that encompass communities of interest is a shield to defend against liability
under the Voting Rights Act. The next inquiry is drawing districts on the basis of communities of interest
and wielding it as a sword.
B. Communities of Interest as a Sword


1. Adherence through State and Local Redistricting Mandates


As discussed above, over twenty states and countless municipalities require the presentation of
communities of common interest in redistricting.278 If new districts break up definable communities of
interest, can the redistricting plan be challenged for violating this principle? After reviewing the law of
various states, I will offer New York as a case study given that this issue is directly on point.
The New York City Charter enumerates a set of prioritized criteria for redistricting the City
Council.279 Those criteria in descending order of importance, are280: (1) districts must be equal in
population;281 (2) “fair and effective representation of racial and language minority groups in New York
City which are protected by the . . . [V]oting [R]ights [A]ct”;282 (3) “district lines shall keep intact
neighborhoods and communities with established ties of common interest and association, whether


269
See J. GERALD HEBERT, ET AL., THE REALISTS’ GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING THE LEGAL PITFALLS 23, 35 (1st ed. 2000)
(citing Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993)). The authors note that the Supreme Court has never addressed the question whether multi-racial
majority-minority districts are compelled under the Voting Rights Act to remedy past racial discrimination.
270
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995).
271
There must be “some common [“tangible”] thread of relevant interests” among the community members. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920.
272
See Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1997). Another supportive method to prove the existence of a community of
interest could be subjective, when the racial or ethnic group, which already shares some socio-economic characteristics, “regard themselves as a
community.” See id.
273
Malone, supra note 165 at 474.
274
Id. at 473
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
JUSTIN LEVITT & BETHANY FOSTER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20-22, 28-35 (2008)
(reviewing commissions).
279
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 51(a) (2001).
280
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1) (2001).
281
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(a) (2001) (stating that the maximum population difference between most and least
populous district is 10% of the average district population, “according to figures available from the most recent decennial census.”).
282
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(b) (2001).
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historical, racial, economic, ethnic, religious or other”;283 (4) area compactness;284 (5) limits on
borough/county crossings;285 (6) no intentional dilution of a political party’s voting strength;286 (7) perimeter
compactness;287 (8) contiguity;288 and (9) if necessitated, allowable borough/county crossings.289
These criteria “shall apply … to the maximum extent practicable” in the redrawing of new City
Council districts.290 The third most important mandate to maintain “neighborhoods and communities with
established ties of common interest and association”291 is the community of interest requirement in
redistricting the New York City Council.292
But while this is required, the legal enforceability of this requirement wains.293 Enforceability
would be through an Article 78 proceeding.294 Specifically, the argument would be that the Commission’s
final districting plan was “made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.”295
In general, a City Council District that does not meet statutory criteria that must be applied “as
practicable” is void.296 In Badillo v. Katz, the New York Supreme Court struck down two of the City
Council’s planned thirty-three “councilmanic” districts.297 It held that those districts did not meet the
statutory criteria of being contiguous, convenient, and compact.298 But it dismissed similar challenges to
other districts, and rejected all challenges that the districts failed to provide adequate racial and ethnic
representation.299
If a district fails to meet the as is “practicable” criteria in order to comply with another statutory
redistricting requirement—or a policy implementing such a requirement—then the district is not void.300 In
Brooklyn Heights Association v. Macchiarola, the Court of Appeals rejected an Article 78 challenge to a
redrawn, majority-Latino City Council district.301 The Commission had connected a pocket of Latinos to
the district through use of several “census blocks”—the smallest geographic units of population provided
by the federal Census Bureau.302 Petitioners argued that by including one of these blocks in the new District
78, the Commission failed to preserve the integrity of Brooklyn Heights, in violation of Section 52(1)’s
third-ranked priority.303 They argued that this problem could be solved, without affecting District 78’s
Latino majority or its contiguity, by splitting Census Block No. 105.304 But the Court held that the
Commission’s decision not to split census blocks was a reasonable interpretation of the Charter requirement
that the Commission base its plan on Census Bureau data.305 This requirement trumped the application of
Section 52(1)’s criteria, to which the Charter “did not impose strict adherence.”306


N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(c) (2001).
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(d) (2001).
285
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(e) (2001).
286
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(f) (2001).
287
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(g) (2001).
288
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(2) (2001).
289
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(3) (2001).
290
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1) (2001).
291
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(c) (2001).
292
Id.
293
See generally Memorandum from Matthew Ahn and Andrew Dunlap to Glenn Magpantay, AALDEF, RE: Potential For Success Of
Voting Rights Act And New York State Law Claims, May 27, 2003.
294
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 et seq (CONSOL. 1909).
295
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803(3) (CONSOL. 1909).
296
Badillo v. Katz, 343 N.Y.S.2d 451, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), aff’d 41 A.D. 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), aff’d 32 N.Y.2d 825 (1973).
297
Id.
298
Id. at 459.
299
Id. at 458.
300
Brooklyn Heights Assoc. v. Macchiarola, 82 N.Y.2d 101, 101 (1993).
301
Id. at 106.
302
Id. at 104-05.
303
Id. at 105.
304
Id.
305
Id. at 106.
306
Id.
283
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This is a very low standard of review. Although districts must keep communities of common
interest together, if they are not breaking up a community of interest it will only be disturbed if its decision
was neither arbitrary nor capricious. This evidences the courts’ recognition that redistricting is a series of
political choices.
2. Adherence through Litigation via Special Masters


The 2010 Census reported a large increase in the minority population of the United States which
then resulted in several new minority-opportunity districts being drawn.307 Many of these districts were
drawn pursuant to litigation.308 Most federal circuits handled redistricting cases, and in seven states judges
appointed special masters to assist them in the redrawing of voting districts.309 Special masters are typically
appointed in complex litigation.310 They are appointed with the consent of the parties, often have technical
expertise, and can manage an expert staff to make recommendation to the court.311 The appointment of
special masters in redistricting cases is common.312 However, the new and widespread development in the
2011 round of redistricting is that judges appointed them to redraw districts that applied traditional
redistricting criteria, as mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States, and explicitly ordered them
to draw districts that encompassed communities of common interest.313 This was the case in Alabama,314
California,315 Georgia,316 Louisiana,317 Michigan,318 and Nevada.319 Occasionally, courts themselves have
redrawn the districts without the reliance on special masters, and there too they have ensured that districts
preserved communities of common interest, such as in New York,320 Minnesota,321 Mississippi, 322 and New
Jersey.323


307
E.g., William D. Hicks, Carl E. Klarner, Seth C. McKee & Daniel A. Smith, Revisiting Majority-Minority Districts and Black
Representation, 71 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, 408, 408-23 (2017).
308
See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1257 (2015); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017).
309
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(ii) (stating how Special masters are appointed).
310
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(i).
311
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b)(1)(b)(2)(D)(c)(1)(A)(B)(C).
312
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Pataki, 207 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re 2012 Legislative Districting of the State, 80 A.3d
1073, 1077 (Md. 2012); In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d 292, 322 (Md. 2002); In re Mehfoud, 927 F.2d 596, at *2 (4th Cir. 1991)
(unpublished table decision); Greig v. St. Martinville, No. 6:00-cv-00603, 2001 WL 34895961 (W.D. La. Sept. 28, 2001); No. 91cv00146, Dkt.
23 (N.D. Miss. June 14, 1993); In re Apportionment of State Legislature, 478 N.W.2d 437, 437 (1991); N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. Austin, 857 F. Supp.
560, 564 (E.D. Mich. 1994); LeRoux v. Secretary of State, 640 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Mich. 2002); Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 756, 757-758
(N.D. Ohio 1992); Harper v. Chicago Heights, No. 1:87-cv-5112, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5025 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2004) (order docketing report of
special master); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 126 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Wis. 1964); Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal. 3d 396, 400 (Cal.
1973); Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 43, 64 (Alaska 1992); Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998,
1002-1003 (D. Ariz. 2002); Guy v. Miller, No. 11-OC-00042-1B, 2011 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 32 (D. Nev. Carson City filed February 24, 2011);
Dillard v. Greensboro, 956 F. Supp. 1576, 1579 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Dillard, 946 F. Supp. 946, 949 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 1996) (order appointing
special master); Larios v. Cox, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (2004); Accord Essex v. Kobach, F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Kan. 2012) (appointed a
"technical advisor”); But see, e.g., Peterson v. Borst, 786 N.E.2d 668, 669 (Ind. 2003); Radanovich v. Bowen, No. 2:11-cv-09786-SVW-PJW,
2012 WL 13012647 (Cal. 2012 filed September 29, 2011). The specific order is available at http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php#NV, archived at
https://perma.cc/594D-2X5D.
313
But see, In re Petition of Reapportionment Comm’n, 303 Conn. 798, 798 (2012) (order directing special master). The significant
filings in this case can be accessed at the following website: http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-CT.php, archived at https://perma.cc/HQ6V-A4G4
(court did not provide for the protection of communities of interest as being a consideration that the special master should weigh in his
deliberations).
314
Dillard v. Greensboro, 956 F. Supp. 1576, 1579-1582 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
315
Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal. 3d 396, 400, 408, 412 (Cal. 1973).
316
Larios v. Cox, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (2004).
317
Greig v. St. Martinville, No. 6:00-cv-00603, 2001 WL 34895961, at ¶ 12 (W.D. La. Sept. 28, 2001).
318
In re Apportionment of the State Legislature 1992, 486 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Mich. 1992).
319
Guy v. Miller, No. 11-OC-00042-1B, 2011 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 32, at *6 (D. Nev. Carson City October 14, 2011).
320
Rodriguez v. Pataki, 207 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
321
Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, No. C0-01-160, at *3-5 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel Mar. 19, 2002) (Final Order
Adopting a Legislative Redistricting Plan),
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/webcontent/lrl/guides/Redistricting/2000/ZachmanvKiffmeyer_2001_LegislativePlanFinal.pdf.
322
Smith v. Hosemann, 852 F. Supp. 2d 757, 767 (S.D. Miss. 2011).
323
Gonzalez v. N. J. Appointment Comm’n, No. MER-L-1173-11, at *19 (N.J. Super. Ct., Mercer Cty. August 31, 2011).
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This specific charge to special masters, authorized by the Supreme Court and mandated by judges
overseeing redistricting cases, shifted the communities of interest standard to become a powerful
affirmative redistricting requirement. The effects were tremendous.
i.

Alabama

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Alabama State Legislature refused to reapportion for
more than sixty years.324 As a result, the Alabama courts historically imposed several redistricting plans.325
On a few occasions, the courts relied on appointed experts or special masters to resolve disputes.326
In Dillard v. City of Greensboro, a special master was appointed to recommend a redistricting plan
for the City of Greensboro that did not violate the Voting Rights Act.327 As special master, the Honorable
Richard M. Gervase reviewed the record and transcripts in the case, including all proposed redistricting
plans, all filings, and all correspondence.328 Special master Gervase was also provided with “explicit
instructions on the legal standards and criteria to be used in drawing up a districting plan.”329 He also
conducted on-site assessments of the “geographical and social boundaries and neighborhoods” of the City
of Greensboro.330 Then, he filed an initial report with his recommendations with the court; the City of
Greensboro filed objections in response, arguing that protecting incumbents is a legitimate factor to
consider in redistricting.331 Special master Gervase then reviewed briefs filed by both parties and found that
incumbency protection is a legitimate factor, albeit subordinate to the traditional redistricting factors, such
as the preservation of communities of interest.332 He submitted a supplemental report and recommended a
second plan that the court ultimately approved and adopted.333
In drafting a redistricting plan, special master Gervase first attempted to define and protect
communities of interest.334 He found that the City of Greensboro’s “relatively small population” made it
harder to identify “district-size communities of interest or neighborhoods” that exist in larger cities.335
Rather, he believed that the communities of interest, to the extent that they existed in Greensboro, were
divided at the “block or subdivision level.”336 Thus, he looked to physical boundaries, such as highways
and main thoroughfares, to identify communities of interest in Greensboro.337
ii.

Georgia

In 2004, Georgia appointed a special master to draw an interim redistricting plan related to the 2000
census redistricting process.338 In Larios v. Cox, the Northern District of Georgia rejected the state
legislative plans and imposed its own interim plan recommended by a special master when the legislature


Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924, 930 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
See, e.g., Burton v. Hobbie, 543 F. Supp. 235, 238 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (finding that the court was obligated to order an interim
redistricting plan); Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924, 940 (M.D. Ala 1972) (finding that the legislature had “more than adequate time” to adopt a
redistricting plan and “every reasonable opportunity to perform its duty” and adopting the plaintiffs’ redistricting plan).
326
Montiel v. Davis, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1284, 1287 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (upholding redistricting plan and rejecting claims that the state
house and senate districts violated the one-person, one-vote constitutional requirement or resulted from racial gerrymandering); Rice v. English,
835 So. 2d 157, 167-68 (Ala. 2002) (upholding redistricting plans and rejecting claims that the plans violated the one-person, one-vote standard
required by the state constitution).
327
Dillard v. Greensboro, 946 F. Supp. 946, 949 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
328
Id.
329
Id.
330
Dillard, 956 F. Supp. 1576, 1579 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
331
Id. at 1581.
332
Id. at 1580.
333
Id. at 1581-82.
334
Id. at 1579.
335
Dillard, 956 F. Supp. 1576, 1579 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
336
Id.
337
Id.
338
Larios v. Cox, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
324
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failed to timely submit new redistricting plans.339 The court appointed Mr. Joseph Hatchett to serve as
special master pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53.340 At the time, Mr. Hatchett, a former Chief
Judge of the Eleventh Circuit and former Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, led the federal and state
appellate practice at the law firm of Akerman Senterfitt.341
Mr. Hatchett was responsible for submitting a report and recommendation, including proposed
redistricting plans, that complied with the law and court guidelines.342 The court outlined three principal
criteria for Mr. Hatchett to follow: “the Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, and certain traditional and
neutral principles of redistricting.”343 Mr. Hatchett was also directed to apply the state’s traditional
redistricting principles of “compactness, contiguity, minimizing the splits of counties, municipalities, and
precincts, and recognizing communities of interests” as well as avoiding multi-member districts.344 He was
“strictly prohibited” from “reviewing or analyzing political data and information, including, but not limited
to, prior districts’ voting performance, incumbent residency, political party registration and past elections
results.”345
iii.

Louisiana

In Louisiana, certain local redistricting plans generated litigation where courts have turned to the
assistance of special masters.346 The most recent round of redistricting in 2010 led to a case in which the
court appointed a special master.347 In Toerner v. Cameron Parish Police Jury, the court upheld the parish
(similar to a county) redistricting plan as an interim, noting among other things that it respects communities
of interest.348 Going forward however, the court ordered the newly elected parish leadership (called a police
jury) to work with a court-appointed special master to further reduce malapportionment.349
During the 2000 round of redistricting, the court in Greig v. St. Martinville appointed a special
master to assist the court in drafting a redistricting plan for city council voting districts.350 Although the
nature of the suit and the instructions given to the special master are unclear,351 the court granted defendant’s
motion to dismiss, suggesting that the plaintiffs’ claims were rendered moot by the adoption of the special
master’s redistricting plan.352 In praising the plan, the court noted that it incorporated traditional non-racebased redistricting principles, including “respect[ing] traditional communities of interest in that it does not
divide between districts . . . .”353
iv.

Nevada

Special masters were used by the Nevada courts in the 2010 redistricting cycle when the legislature
failed to agree on a redistricting plan.354 In Guy v. Miller, the court allowed the parties to make suggestions
and objections to the appointment of the special masters.355 Also, the parties briefed the court on the most


339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355

Larios v. Cox, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
Larios, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.
Id.
Id.
Larios, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1361.
Toerner v. Cameron Par. Police Jury, No. 2:11-cv-1302, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90584, at *24 (W.D. La. Aug. 15, 2011).
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
Greig v. St. Martinville, No. 6:00-cv-00603, 2001 WL 34895961, ¶ 4 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2001).
Id.
Id. (order granting motion to dismiss).
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
Guy v. Miller, No. 11-OC-00042-1B, 2011 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 32, at *3 (D. Nev. Carson City filed October 14, 2011).
Id. at *1.
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pertinent legal issues before any further instructions were given to the special masters.356 Three special
masters were appointed and were given the following criteria to guide the redistricting process: (1) create
contiguous districts; (2) preserve political subdivisions; (3) preserve communities of interest;357 (4) create
compact and regularly shaped districts; (5) avoid contests between incumbents; and (6) comply with Voting
Rights Act requirements.358 The special masters were required to hold two public hearings and accept
additional briefs and comments by any interested parties before drafting their plan.359 After the release of
the special masters’ final report, parties to the litigation were given ten days to raise any objections or
revisions before the court made the final determination.360 The court held that the special masters’ plan was
a “reasonable application of the criteria and was in compliance with all legal requirements.”361 The special
masters’ plan was adopted without any further involvement from the court or the legislature.362
v.

Maryland Exception

However, some courts have appointed special masters and required that they draw districts to
preserve communities of interest, but when those redistricting plans failed to preserve communities of
interest, the courts have been unwilling to order anew. For example, Gorrell v. O’Malley was a challenge
to Maryland’s congressional reapportionment where a federal court addressed Maryland’s treatment of the
communities of interest standard.363 In Gorrell, the court dismissed a challenge to the congressional districts
based on partisan gerrymandering and insufficient consideration of communities of interest.364 Although
the dismissal was affirmed for plaintiffs’ lack of standing, nevertheless the reasoning in the district court’s
opinion gave some insight into how the communities of interest standard has been applied in Maryland.365
Plaintiffs claimed that the congressional reapportionment failed to respect communities of interest
because it divided farmers between multiple districts.366 The court found that although communities of
interest were disrupted by the map, that disruption was not sufficient grounds to reject the map.367 The court
held that while preserving communities of interest is a legitimate goal for the state to pursue, it is not a
constitutional requirement, and thus its absence alone does not render the map unconstitutional.368 This
language suggests that communities seeking to preserve unity of representation should concentrate their
efforts on the political bodies drawing the maps in Maryland, as the courts may be unlikely to grant relief
on those grounds. But while the result in this case seems to have engulfed the original stated requirement
to preserve communities of interest, in actuality it follows other cases that a breakup of a community of
interest is insufficient, alone and by itself, to undo an entire redistricting plan.
These cases in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Nevada, demonstrate how special masters not
only enhanced public input and transparency in the redistricting process, but also elevated the requirement
of communities of interest in newly drawn districts.


Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7 (the court’s order stipulates that, to the extent practicable, the special masters shall avoid dividing groups of common social
(e.g. educational backgrounds, housing patterns), economic (e.g. income levels, living conditions), cultural, or language characteristics) (Ct.’s
order designating criteria and schedule for special masters, filed September 21, 2011).
358
Id. at *8-9.
359
Id. at *3-4.
360
Id. at *1-2.
361
See id., (filed October 27, 2011) (final order approving the final districts) available at http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php#NV,
archived at https://perma.cc/UY9R-BJ28.
362
Guy v. Miller, No. 11-OC-00042-1B, 2011 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 32, at *3 (D. Nev. Carson City filed October 14, 2011).
363
Gorrell v. O’Malley, No. WDQ-11-2975, 2012 WL 226919 (D. Md. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, No. 12-1234, 2012 WL 2855948
(4th Cir. 2012).
364
Id.
365
Id. at *3.
366
Id. at *3.
367
Id. at *3-*4.
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Id.
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3. Adherence through Litigation via Court-Developed Plans


Courts are not required to use outside technical assistants to redraw district boundaries.369
Occasionally, courts themselves have redrawn the districts without the reliance on special masters. Here
too, they have ensured that districts preserved communities of common interest, such as in New York,370
Minnesota,371 Mississippi, 372 and New Jersey.373
i.

New York

In New York, during the 2010 congressional redistricting, competing legislative coalitions failed
in the game of brinkmanship, and a federal court ultimately formulated the congressional map for the
state.374 Rather than appoint a special master as had been done in the past,375 the court instead referred the
case to a magistrate judge to redraw congressional districts.376 In referring the case to Magistrate Judge
Roanne L. Mann, the court appointed Nathaniel Persily as an expert to assist Magistrate Judge Mann in
formulating the plan.377 The court ordered the Magistrate Judge to, where possible, draw districts that
preserve communities of interest.378 Additionally, the court also authorized the magistrate judge to “consider
other factors and proposals submitted by the parties, which, … are reasonable and comport with the
Constitution and applicable federal and state law.”379
The Magistrate Judge took particular care in her “Report and Recommendation” to emphasize the
transparency and inclusivity of her mapmaking process.380
The court solicited public comment, including non-party proposals, and accepted correspondence and other
communications from interested members of the public.381 The court held a lengthy hearing at which parties
and non-parties were given the opportunity to present their views.382 After reviewing all of these
comments—written and oral—the court formulated its Recommended Plan, and, where feasible,
incorporated proposed revisions that enhanced the criteria identified by the Panel.383 The litigation
surrounding the 2010 round of redistricting in New York furnished a strong precedent favoring extensive
public participation in “court-drawn redistricting.”384


N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 50 (2004).
Rodriguez v. Pataki, 207 F. Supp. 2d 123, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
371
Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, No. C0-01-160, at 3-5 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel Mar. 19, 2002) (Final Order Adopting a Legislative
Redistricting Plan), http://www.mncourts.gov/documents/0/Public/Court_Information_Office/redistrictingpanel/Final_Legislative_Order.PDF.,
archived at https://perma.cc/H2AY-HGU7
372
Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
373
Id. at 49.
374
Favors v. Cuomo, No. 1:11-cv-05632 (E.D.N.Y. March 19, 2012).
375 Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Rodriguez v. Pataki, 207 F. Supp. 2d 123, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). (In both the 1990 and
2000 rounds of redistricting, retired United States District Judge Frederick B. Lacey was appointed as Special Master.)
376
Rodriguez, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 124.
377
Favors v. Cuomo, No. 1:11-cv-05632 (E.D.N.Y. March 19, 2012).
378
Order of Referral to Magistrate Judge, Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5632 RR GEL, at 3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012 (emphasis added).
(By comparison, the court in the Rodriguez case instructed the Special Master it appointed in the 2000 round of redistricting as follows:
“adhere to and, where possible, reconcile the following guidelines:
(a)
Districts shall be of substantially equal population, compact, and contiguous.
(b)
The plan shall comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) and with all other applicable provisions of the Voting Rights Act.”)
207 F. Supp. 2d at 125.
379
Id.
380
It is notable that Persily’s affidavit in this case, filed with Magistrate Judge’s “Report and Recommendation,” highlighted some factors
that the Magistrate Judge consciously chose not to consider, namely “the Recommended Plan deliberately ignores political data, such as voter
registration or election return data, as well as incumbent residence … to avoid picking favorites in its construction of districts. Persily Aff. ¶ 58,
March 12, 2012.
381
Report and Recommendation, Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5632 DLI RR, 2012 WL 928216, 41 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012), report
and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 11-CV-5632 RR GEL, 2012 WL 928223 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012).
382
Id. at 21.
383
Id. at 48-49.
384
Opinion and Order, Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5632 RR GEL, 2012 WL 928223, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012).
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As the court instructed the magistrate judge to preserve communities of interest where possible in
her plan, the court’s final “Opinion and Order” contained significant language in its “Order and Referral to
Magistrate Judge”:
The Court noted that “the identification of a “community of interest,” a necessary first step
to ‘preservation,’ requires insights that cannot be obtained from maps or even census
figures. Such insights require an understanding of the community at issue, which can often
be acquired only through direct and extensive experience with the day-to-day lives of an
area’s residents. . . . [C]ourts are understandably inclined to accord redistricting weight
only to the preservation of obviously established and compact communities of interest. The
Recommended Plan does this by respecting certain widely recognized, geographically
defined communities.385
The basis of this article is a theory and method to identify geographically defined communities of interest
for the purposes of redistricting, to which a federal court in New York gave strong credence.386
ii.

Minnesota

In 2000, the Minnesota Supreme Court appointed a five-judge special redistricting panel (the
“Special Redistricting Panel” or the “Panel”) to redraw Minnesota’s congressional and state legislative
maps after it became apparent that the legislature might not timely enact a new redistricting plan.387 The
Panel accepted written submissions and also held a number of hearings to consider the public’s thoughts
on redistricting.388 In redrawing Minnesota’s congressional and state legislative districts, the Special
Redistricting Panel paid special attention to maintaining communities of interest where possible. Thus, in
drawing the congressional districts, the Panel acknowledged the need to recognize and account for the
inherently different interests shared by each of the state’s rural populations, Native-American populations,
counties with affinities, and groups with similar land use interests.389 Likewise, the Panel attempted to keep
communities of interest (Native-American reservations, counties in southwest Minnesota, and the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area) intact in single state senate districts to the extent possible.390
After the 2010 census, the Minnesota legislature passed a redistricting plan, which the governor
vetoed.391 The Minnesota Supreme Court again appointed a special redistricting panel of judges to redraw
Minnesota’s congressional and legislative districts.392 The Panel adopted a “least changes” redistricting map
that took into account as much as possible issues dealing with population equality, statutory requirements
regarding convenience, contiguity and compactness, and respect for minority and Native-American
populations and communities of interest in the state.393


Id. at 14-16. Quotations and citations omitted.
Id. at 22-23.
387
See Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, 629 N.W.2d 98 (Minn. 2001).
388
Id.
389
Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, No. C0-01-160, at 5-6, 9 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel Mar. 19, 2002) (Final Order Adopting a
Congressional Redistricting Plan), http://www.mncourts.gov/documents/CIO/redistrictingpanel/Final_Congressional_Order.PDF., archived at
https://perma.cc/H2AY-HGU7.
407
Id. at 3-5.
391
Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel 2012).
392
Id. at 376.
393
Id. at 382-85.
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Mississippi

During the 2011 legislative session, the Mississippi legislature failed to agree on district lines.394 A
court decided that the 2011 state legislative elections could take place within the pre-existing districts
because the legislature’s obligation was to redistrict the state lines by 2012.395 The court rejected the
suggestion of appointing a special master to redraw the lines.396 Conversely, the court in Smith v. Hosemann
drew its own maps when a suit was brought alleging that the previous maps were malapportioned in the
wake of the 2010 census.397 The Court, in describing its methodology, stated that, “[w]e have also given
our best efforts in respecting the community of interest of each district, although we recognize we have been
constrained by legal requirements from perfectly achieving this goal.”398
iv.

New Jersey

The New Jersey 2010 redistricting process was subject to two legal challenges.399 In Gonzalez v.
New Jersey Appointment Comm’n, a judge granted a motion to dismiss the challenge brought by Tea Party
members to the legislative redistricting plan on grounds that the legislative plan did not adequately represent
third-party and unaffiliated citizens.400 The judge ruled that the map did not involve any constitutional
violations or discrimination.401 The judge also noted that preserving “communities of interest” was a valid
interest for the commission to protect and would not be disturbed.402
When courts redraw districts or appoint special masters to redraw voting districts, the redistricting
process usually becomes more transparent, public input from non-parties is accepted, and the goal of
preserving communities of interest is elevated.403 This elevation is especially critical in jurisdictions in
which community of common interest is absent as a stated requirement or guidance in redistricting. In most
of these states, the preservation of communities of interest is not required.404 Courts have read in this
requirement in its district drawing criteria or in its charge to special masters when redrawing district
boundaries.405 When redistricting is litigated it becomes more democratized ensuring greater meaningful
representation for communities of common interest.
In effect, once in litigation, communities of common interest have become a commanding, if not
mandatory, redistricting criterion. It was once a shield that has become a sword to wield.
4. Adherence through Litigation through The Voting Rights Act (Section 5)


Some advocates have tried to protect communities of interest through the enforcement provisions
(Section 5) of the Voting Rights Act which prevents the retrogression of minority representation.406


Miss. NAACP v. Barbour, No 3:11-cv-00159, 2011 WL 1870222, at *3-4 (S.D. Miss. May 16, 2011), aff’d No. 11-82 (2011).
Id at *7.
396
Id.
397
Smith v. Hosemann, No. 3:01-cv-00855, 2011 WL 6950914 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2011).
398
Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
399
Gonzalez v. New Jersey Appointment Comm’n, No. L-001173-11 (N.J. Super. Ct., Mercer Cty.) and No. C-000069-11 (N.J. Super. Ct.,
Ocean Cty.) (dismissed Aug. 31, 2011).
400
Id.
401
Id. at 56.
402
Id. at 49.
403
See generally N.Y.C. Districting Comm'n, Submission for Preclearance of the Final Districting Plan for the Council of
the City of New York (Mar. 22, 2013).
404
Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 77, 87 (1985).
405
Id.
406
In 2013, The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the coverage formula (Section 4) that brought jurisdictions under Section 5 coverage.
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529. But Section 5 itself has never been declared unconstitutional. Although it is not applied in force because
no jurisdictions are covered, due to Shelby, its legal framework is intact. Advocates are pressing Congress to update Section 4. See Wendy
Weiser & Alicia Bannon, Democracy: An Election Agenda for Candidates, Activists, and Legislators, Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. Law
(2018),
411
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Advocates in New York used this strategy after the 2000 census with the New York City Districting
Commission (“Districting Commission”) when it redrew district boundaries for the New York City
Council.407 Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, before a redistricting plan of a covered jurisdiction
can take effect, it must be precleared by the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.408 New York County (Manhattan) is covered under Section 5 because the county has
a history of voter discrimination.409
Asian-American groups engaged the preclearance process with a special emphasis on Chinatown
in Lower Manhattan.410 There was insufficient population to draw a majority-Asian City Council district
that met the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.411 Since Chinatown could not be its own district,
advocates pressed the Commission to the Charter’s requirements to preserve community of interest to
ensure some meaningful representation for Chinatown.412
i.

Background

Before 2000, Chinatown was in a city council district with Battery Park City, Tribeca, SoHo, and
the Financial District.413 These other neighborhoods were predominantly white and economically
affluent.414 White candidates coming from these neighborhoods routinely ran in the district, and their votes
always overwhelmed the votes for Asian-American candidates running from Chinatown.415 Generally,
Asian-Americans voted for Asian-American candidates and whites voted for white candidates.416 The result
was that Asian-Americans had never been represented by a candidate of their own choosing.417
Asian-American advocates urged for a new configuration of district boudnaires altogether, noting the
history of racially polarized voting.418 They also illustrated the stark differences between Chinatown and
these four neighborhoods’ income, housing, and community needs.419
They argued that Chinatown should have been drawn into the same district as the adjacent Lower
East Side.420 Both neighborhoods had similar socio-economic characteristics and shared several common
interests and concerns.421 They constituted a single community of interest, meeting the City Charter’s third


http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Brennan%20Center%20Solutions%202018.%20Democracy%20Agenda.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/J96F-3SZA.
407
N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 50 (2004).
408
42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
409
Id.
410
Comment Letter from the Asian Am. Bar Association of N.Y., to U.S. Dep't of Justice, Voting Section (March 12, 2003) (on file with
author) (opposing preclearance); Redistricting of Chinatown Finalized, SING TAO DAILY, Feb. 27, 2003 (Larry Tung, trans.),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/citizen/mar03/chinese_redistricting.shtml, archived at https://perma.cc/LKS9-Q9FV.
411
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-52 (1986); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 1 (2009).
412
Judith Reed, Of Boroughs, Boundaries and Bullwinkles: The Limitations of Single-Member Districts in a Multiracial Context, 19
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 759, 772-73 (1991-1992).
413
Leland T. Saito, Asian Pacific American Electoral and Political Power: Panel 1: The Sedimentation of Political Inequality: Charter
Reform and Redistricting in New York City’s Chinatown, 1989-1991, 8 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 123, 135-140 (Spr. 2002); City Council
Changes: A Disappointment, OUTLOOK, (Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York, NY), Spring 1992, at 1; Margaret
Fung, A District Like a Mosaic, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 12, 1991, at 60 (advocating for a City Council district that included Chinatown with the
Lower East Side).
414
Leland T. Saito, Asian Pacific American Electoral and Political Power: Panel 1: The Sedimentation of Political Inequality: Charter
Reform and Redistricting in New York City’s Chinatown, 1989-1991, 8 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 123, 125 (Spr. 2002).
415
Id.
416
Comment Letter from Margaret Fung, et al., Asian Am. Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, to Joseph Rich, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chief of
Voting Section (April 29, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fung Letter].
417
The incumbent was Alan Gerson who was elected in 2001. Searchlight 2002 – District 1 Lower Manhattan, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Jan.
29, 2001), https://www.gothamgazette.com/searchlight2001/dist1.html, archived at https://perma.cc/7HUR-UZND (reporting primary election
results)
418
See Fung Letter, supra note 416.
419
Id.
420
Glenn D. Magpantay, Staff Att’y, Asian Am. Legal Defense and Education Fund, Statement to the New York City Districting
Commission (Nov. 19, 2002).
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Searchlight 2002 – New York City Redistricting, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Oct. 24, 2002),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/searchlight/redistricting2.shtml, archived at https://perma.cc/9CBV-YMHK.
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most important redistricting criterion.422 The minority voters in the Lower East Side were Latino, with a
growing number of Asian-Americans.423 Latinos and Asians were also politically cohesive in that they voted
for the same candidates for office, and those candidates were Asian-Americans from Chinatown.424
Advocates recounted many shared interests and concerns among the residents of Chinatown and
the Lower East Side.425 Those interests included: employment (e.g., low wages, sweatshop conditions, labor
exploitation, workers’ rights, and job availability); housing (e.g., lack of affordable housing, decrepit
conditions, and landlord accountability for substandard conditions); immigrants (e.g., the need for more
immigrant services, immigrant rights and empowerment, and immigrant alienation); education (e.g.,
bilingual services and teachers, English as a Second Language programs, overcrowded classes, poor
education quality and performance, and vocational education and adult literacy); health (e.g., the lack of
health insurance, affordable and accessible health care and health care facilities); and neighborhood quality
(e.g., sanitation (particularly garbage and street cleanliness), and pollution (both air and noise)).426
The neighborhoods of Chinatown and the Lower East Side had “established ties of common interest
and association” as recognized by the City Charter.427 Common associational ties were demonstrated by
the existence of services utilized by both neighborhoods, such as community health clinics, immigrant
service providers, and business assistance centers.428 These services were comprised of both municipal and
private social service agencies.429 The neighborhoods also shared ties of common association in struggles
around political organizing.430 Asian-Americans in Chinatown and Latinos in the Lower East Side worked
together through advocacy groups and coalitions to press for policy changes to benefit both groups and
neighborhoods.431
Conversely, Chinatown should not have been kept in the same City Council district with Tribeca,
SoHo, Battery Park City, and the Financial District.432 The areas were not only dissimilar in their
demographic makeup, but also in their needs and concerns. For example, with regards to public safety,
residents in Tribeca, SoHo, Battery Park City, and the Financial District had positive police relations,
whereas residents in Chinatown and the Lower East Side suffered from police misconduct and sought
greater civilian oversight.433 Regarding economic development, Tribeca, SoHo, Battery Park City, and the
Financial District sought the construction of new high-rise apartment buildings to appeal to professionals.434
Chinatown and the Lower East Side were most concerned about gentrification, job creation, small business
development, enforcement of occupational safety regulations, and labor/minimum wage laws.435
Chinatown and the Lower East Side should have been drawn into the same city council district.
Such a district would have given residents the opportunity to be meaningfully represented by a candidate
for whom they had voted. The Districting Commission instead opted to redraw districts in a way that


Comment Letter from Margaret Fung, et al., Asian Am. Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, to Joseph Rich, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chief of
Voting Section (April 29, 2003) (on file with author).
423
HUM, supra note 7, at 25 (discussion of Lower East Side).
424
Asian Americans are politically cohesive with Latinos in District 1. Both groups make up 53.8% of the VAP in the benchmark District
1. The Commission’s expert, Dr. Lisa Handley, found that in 1993 and 1997, the preferred candidate of Asian American voters was also the
preferred candidate of Latino voters. See Submission Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act for Preclearance for the 2003 Final Districting
Plan for The Council of the City of New York, March 31, 2003 at Appendix 1 at 16 (Dr. Lisa Handley Expert Report, 16-18).
425
Id.
426
HUM, supra note 7, at 25.
427
N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2-A, § 52(1)(c) (2004) (italics added).
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HUM, supra note 7.
429
Comment Letter from Margaret Fung, et al., Asian Am. Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, to Joseph Rich, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Chief of
Voting Section (April 29, 2003) (on file with author).
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See id.
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Id.
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Id.
433
These findings were documented by the neighborhoods’ respective Community Boards, which are community advisory committees.
Chinatown and the Lower East Side are in Community District 3. Tribeca, SoHo, Battery Park City, and the Financial District are in Community
District 1. NYC Department of City Planning, Community District Needs, Manhattan, 2002
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Id.
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Id.
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ensured the reelection of the current city councilmember, who was not supported by the Asian-American
or Latino voters of the district.436
The Districting Commission redrew districts to ensure the election of current city councilmembers,
and it subordinated its own Charter-mandated criteria to achieve this goal.437 In Lower Manhattan, the
district was carefully drawn around the incumbent’s electoral powerbase of Tribeca and SoHo where most
of his supporters resided.438 A new configuration that adhered to the Charter’s mandate to respect
communities of interest would have moved the incumbent outside of the district encompassing
Chinatown.439 This would have then forced him to run against another sitting councilmember residing in
Greenwich Village, a mostly white and equally affluent community.440 To avoid such a result, the
Districting Commission maintained the district boundaries most favorable to the incumbent. But this was
not at all required or prompted by the City Charter.441
The Districting Commission deviated from the Charter’s redistricting requirements in ensuring the
fair and effective representation of racial minorities and keeping intact communities of common interest.442
The Districting Commission kept Chinatown in the same district as Battery Park City, Tribeca,
SoHo, and the Financial District.443 They broke up a community of common interest. Litigation under the
City Charter had remote possibilities for success,444 so lawyers turned to the Voting Rights Act’s Section
5.445
ii.
Voting Rights Act Section 5 Review
The Commission City Council redistricting plan had to be precleared by the U.S. Justice
Department pursuant to Section 5.446
In preclearance, the covered county must demonstrate that the redistricting Commission does not
have a retrogressive minority voting strength, that is to wit, racial and ethnic minority voters are not in a
worse position to effectively exercise the electoral franchise.447 During the preclearance period, interested
individuals and community groups may review the submission and comment.448
In determining whether the Commission’s redistricting plan had the prohibited purpose of
weakening minority voting strength, “[t]he extent to which the plan departs from objective redistricting
criteria [and] to which the plan is inconsistent with the jurisdiction's stated redistricting standards” are
considered.449
Advocates showed how the Commission’s redistricting plan in Lower Manhattan departed from
objective redistricting criteria and was inconsistent with New York City’s mandated redistricting


Redistricting of Chinatown Finalized, supra note 410.
New York City Redistricting, supra note 421.
438
Id.
439
Id.
440
Combining Chinatown with the Lower East Side would not compromise the Latino power base in the Lower East Side. Asian
Americans and Latinos already had a history of voting for the same candidates. The more likely outcome is the commonality of class interests
would show that Chinatown resident would vote for Latino candidates probably coming from the Lower East Side.
441
See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTER, at ch. 2-A, § 52 (2004).
442
N.Y. CITY CHARTER, at ch. 2-A, § 52(1) (b),(c) (2004).
443
N.Y.C. Districting Comm'n, Submission for Preclearance of the Final Districting Plan for the Council of the City of New York (Mar.
22, 2013), at 29.
444
See generally Memorandum from Matthew Ahn and Andrew Dunlap to Glenn Magpantay, AALDEF, RE: Potential For Success Of
Voting Rights Act And New York State Law Claims, May 27, 2003
445
Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5632 RR GEL, 2012 WL 928223, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012).
446
Submission Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act for Preclearance for the 2003 Final Districting Plan for The Council of the City
of New York, March 31, 2003.
447
N.Y.C. Districting Comm'n, Submission for Preclearance of the Final Districting Plan for the Council of the City of New York (Mar.
22, 2013), at 36.
448
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51.29 (2001) (allowing
individuals and groups to make comments under Section 5).
449
28 C.F.R. § 51.59.
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standards.450 They showed how the redistricting plan did not give Asian-Americans “fair and effective
representation,” did not keep a community of interest whole, and improperly subordinated these to the
protection of incumbents,451 and overstated districting criteria.452 This violated the Charter and signaled an
intent to retrogress minority voting strength.
Even though explicit redistricting requirements in the City Charter453 should have been followed,
they were not and the Department of Justice did not object to the new plan.454 Perhaps under a different set
of circumstances the Department would have objected but it did not. This strategy of using the enforcement
provisions (Section 5) of the Voting Rights Act to compel the preservation of the communities of interest
requirement was novel but ultimately unsuccessful. It therefore seems that the strongest method to
preserving of communities of interest to give communities of shared interest meaningful representation is
through litigation, and especially when litigation brings in a special master or technical expert to redrew
new district boundaries.
V. CONCLUSION


Drawing congressional, state legislative, or city councilmanic districts to encompass communities
of common interest has always been a vague sought after, yet elusive ideal. Although the Supreme Court
requires the preservation of communities of interest, redistricting is often challenging to meaningfully
define, apply, and deploy.455 Defining a community of interest is not difficult in itself. Even though it can
be subjective, it can also use multiple types and sorts of objective data and information. Yet, in redistricting,
it must also be spatially defined, which most other scholars have failed to tackle.
The Court has defined communities of interest as groupings of people who have similar values,
shared interests, or common characteristics.456 To apply this definition, this article has defined a legal
theory, and deployment practices to concretely define and apply this requirement.
Once defined, applying a community of interest in the development of a redistricting plan can be
exceedingly helpful. A spatially defined community of interest can help advocates press for an area to keep
whole or identify neighborhoods to keep together or separate. It can be used for plan analysis, where
redistricting plans or specific district proposals can be measured against proposed boundary lines.
Communities of interest has been used to adhere to the law in both the affirmative and defensive contexts.
In the past, the concept of communities of interest has been an effective shield. The drawing of
districts based on communities of interest has overcome a constitutional challenge to minority-opportunity
districts. Past efforts to challenge minority-opportunity district as improper racial gerrymanders under the
14th Amendment can be deflected once it can be shown that common interests, not race alone, was the basis
of a particular district.
Today, communities of interest has become a sword, especially when the redistricting process is
litigated. While many state and local laws require the drawing of districts that preserve communities of
common interest, these provisions are not strongly actionable. The standard of review is sometimes so low,
and district drawers are allowed so much discretion, that the breaking up of a cohesive well-defined
community of common interest has been permitted. However, courts adjudicating redistricting lawsuits,
especially those where special masters have been appointed, have compelled districts to encompass
communities of interest. Litigation, through the application of the Supreme Court’s mandate, has elevated
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the preservation of communities of interest. This has become a much more powerful strategy in ensuring
the representation of communities of color in redistricting. Together, these strategies have democratized
the redistricting process for all.
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